Lt. Cmdr. Edward Lin Charged with Spying for China…And US Made It Easy

Bayard & Holmes

~ Jay Holmes

Once again, the US government has allowed your tax money and the nation’s security to be compromised in ridiculous fashion.

On Friday, April 8, 2016, the US Navy charged an active-duty maritime reconnaissance officer with passing US military secrets to a foreign government. The US Navy filed multiple charges, including espionage, against Lieutenant Commander Edward Lin during an Article 32 hearing in Norfolk, Virginia.

 

Lt. Cmdr. Edward Lin Image by US Naval Institute

Lt. Cmdr. Edward Lin
Image by US Naval Institute

 

Originally, the US Navy had not released the suspect’s name or the name of the country for which he (allegedly) spied because the Navy had designated the case as a “‘National Security Case.”

A “National Security Case,” according to the US military, is one which “ . . . to any serious degree, involves the compromise of a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or terrorist group; involves an allegation of willful compromise of classified information, affects our military or defense capability to successfully resist hostile or destructive action, overt or covert; or involves an act of terrorism.”

The Navy explained that, “NCIS and FBI are still investigating the details of this case, and, therefore, we cannot provide any additional details at this time.” Since then, unidentified Navy officers have identified the accused as Lt. Cmdr. Lin and the beneficiary of Lin’s espionage work as Communist China.

You remember China? It’s that country that has been rapidly expanding its military and is claiming large areas of international waters as their national domain. Yes, that China.

Though redacted, the charging document describes a depressing story in which Lin transported secret information out of the country without permission and then lied about his whereabouts when he returned to duty. The charging documents allege that Lin successfully committed espionage twice and attempted espionage on three other occasions. Lin is currently in pre-trial confinement at the Naval Consolidated Brig in Chesapeake, Virginia.

Given that Lin had a high security clearance and served on E-P3E Aries II reconnaissance aircraft, he likely did tremendous damage to the US.

The technical and operational information that Lin was entrusted to safeguard constitutes an intelligence coup for Communist China. The reporting on this case will understandably focus on Lin’s access as an officer in the Commander, Patrol and Reconnaissance Group.

However, Lin had access to a whole other trove of treasure for China.

He served as the Congressional Liaison for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Finance Management and Comptroller from 2012 to 2014. In his position as liaison to Congress, Lin would have had access to a vast array of sensitive information from every part of the US Navy.

It would be easy to assume that Edward Lin went to great lengths to succeed at such a villainous subterfuge. He didn’t. It was all too easy, and anyone could do it.

Most of the outrage – all of which Lin and my beloved Navy deserve – will be directed toward Edward Lin. In my opinion, Lin is just one small aspect of a much larger problem that we should not continue to ignore.

How did the US Navy, the FBI, and the rest of the US government manage to miss Lin’s (alleged) spying for what was likely more than a decade?

In the case of the FBI, we can forgive them if their pathetically small counterintelligence efforts missed Lin. Given their lack of resources and minimal mandate, the only surprise from the FBI counterintelligence team would be if they ever actually stumble upon an espionage operation. I am not knocking the FBI agents tasked with counterintelligence. They are undoubtedly as well trained and dedicated as other FBI agents, but they simply lack the means to conduct anything like an effective counterintelligence operation.

As for the US Navy, the Department of Defense, the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branches, I am much less forgiving. For one thing, Lin was a Taiwanese-born Taiwanese citizen until he was 14 years old. I disagree with the current policy that allows foreign born naturalized citizens to so easily gain high security clearances. I’m sure it’s the more politically correct thing to do, but it’s an asinine policy.

This is not the first time that the United States has lavished secret information on a Taiwanese born “alleged” spy.

Refer to the Wen Ho Lee* case if you are uncertain of the wisdom of this policy. In any event the proof is in the pudding, or in this case, the proof is in the feast that Lin served up to hostile Communist China.

If Lin is indeed guilty, then he deserves a life sentence of hard labor at Leavenworth or some obscure distant location. Most of my cohorts in the US Military and the US Intelligence Community will likely disagree with me and would prefer for Lin to be executed.

I can’t agree to that because I don’t support the death penalty. All judicial proceedings depend on the integrity and wisdom of those involved in prosecutions, and I can’t ignore that people are not perfect. For example, the government that is prosecuting Lin is the same government that was stupid enough and careless enough to make it easy for Lin to rob the taxpayers blind and endanger our national security. We now know about Edward Lin, which begs a question . . . Who do we not know about?

Regardless of the outcome of Lin’s trial, we, as American citizens, should start demanding better security standards to protect our national security and the billions of dollars in technology that we are all financing. Until our politicians have reason to think that the public is paying attention to our pathetically poor security policies, they will have no motive to fix it.

I hope that all of our readers will look beyond Edward Lin and tell their Congressweasels and their White House to start acting like adults on issues of national security. Edward Lin, if guilty, is a dangerous criminal, but this is a democracy, and We the People allowed him to do what he did.

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* Note to Wen Ho Lee:  I am not the New York Times. Don’t dream of sending lawyers in my direction. You and I have met before. I meant what I said . . . Does your hand still hurt?

Defense Industry UFOs on the Home Front!

Bayard & Holmes

~ Jay Holmes

With so many deadly conflicts brewing around the globe, it’s easy to lose sight of less spectacular defense news at home. Changes in the defense industry and their impacts on taxpayers are not likely to generate front page headlines with so many air strikes, battles and terrorist strikes filling the daily news reports. But sometimes, the bomb-free battles inside the Beltway can impact our national security more than anything that will ever happen in Syria or Ukraine.

 

Actual photo of Lockheed and Sikorsky in an intimate embrace.

Actual photo of Lockheed and Sikorsky in an intimate embrace.

 

One particular event in the defense industry might generate more impacts then were intended by the defense contractors involved. Lockheed Martin’s pending purchase of Sikorsky Aircraft for nine billion dollars has set off a ripple effect in the US defense community.

Last week, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Frank Kendall stated that in the future, he would seek to deter consolidation of top tier defense contractors. Kendall explained that, “Mergers such as this, combined with significant financial resources of the largest defense companies, strategically position the acquiring companies to dominate large parts of the defense industry.”

I can understand Kendall’s concerns. With the current number of large defense contractors, we are paying high prices for our high-tech military gear. In some cases, we are paying high prices for very low-tech gear, as well. Having fewer contractors might lead to less innovation and higher prices.

Kendall’s comments only surprised me because he was open and frank. In the Pentagon, that can be more dangerous than vacationing in Syria.

I am guessing that Kendall must have reason to believe that the White House shares his concerns. Not surprisingly, his comments generated what we might refer to as Unsourced Flying Opinions. To save space, let’s just call them UFOs.

A variety of “defense analysts” have been responding loudly to anyone who will listen that Kendall is creating “uncertainty” in the defense industry. According to some analysts, since large defense contractors will be uncertain about the viability of future mergers, they will be impaired in doing business.

Perhaps they will, and perhaps that’s a good thing. There has been all too much “certainty” in the defense contracting market. Certainly the manufacturing of complex high-tech defense items such as the F-35 fighter or the Gerald Ford supercarrier require a high degree of certainty once production starts, but the selection process should be an open field where the best ideas and greatest efficiencies can compete for contracts.

As Kendall pointed out, “With size comes power, and the department’s experience with large defense contractors is that they are not hesitant to use this power for corporate advantage. The trend toward fewer and larger prime contractors has the potential to affect innovation, limit the supply base, pose entry barriers to small, medium, and large businesses, and ultimately reduce competition, resulting in higher prices to be paid by the American taxpayer in order to support our war fighters.”

With so much money at stake, taxpayers should expect an increase in UFOs concerning defense spending and any further restrictions on defense contractor mergers. When reading the opinions of defense or national security “think tanks,” it’s a good idea to find out who funds them. You can bet that think tanks that are funded by large defense contractors are not going to think highly of Frank Kendall. As a taxpayer, I am starting to grow fond of him.

So far, the Department of Justice is wisely staying out of the debate on future defense acquisitions. Kendall has indicated that the Pentagon will work with Congress to set new policies governing defense contractors. As much as I agree with Frank Kendall’s intent, I disagree with his optimism for possible congressional action. I can easily imagine the sound of industrial strength shredders in the basement of the Capital building as underpaid staffers work overtime handling all those proposed defense contractor rules. But that doesn’t mean that Kendall’s concerns won’t have a real impact.

Kendall and his cohorts in the Pentagon have one very large ace up their sleeve.

If you want to do business in the defense market, you need happy customers, and the biggest customer of all is the Pentagon. In theory, it is only one customer, but in practice, the Pentagon can block anything involving publicly funded research and technology from sale to foreign customers. That leaves large defense contractors with a very small list of customers.

So what does this quiet and largely unnoticed battle in the Beltway mean?

My best guess is that the Pentagon, with the approval of the White House, is simply saying that it will not allow the US defense market to be too heavily influenced by any single competitor. Getting action for something this complex and this political from Congress is unlikely. Getting a defense contract from an unhappy Pentagon is even less likely. Let’s give kudos to Frank Kendall for standing up for the taxpayers and for national security.

Which US Spy Agency Does What to Whom?

Bayard & Holmes

By Piper Bayard & Jay Holmes

One of the most common mistakes in fiction is confusing which intelligence agencies have the power to do what to whom and where they have the authority to do it. Today, we want to clear up that confusion.

Wiki 2015 March US_Intelligence_Community_Logo_blue

While there are numerous military and civilian intelligence agencies, we’ll focus on four of the biggest branches, which are also the ones most commonly assigned imaginative extracurricular activities books and movies – the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA” or “Company”), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), and the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (“NSA/CSS” or “NSA”). 

 

Wiki 2015 Mar CIA Logo

Central Intelligence Agency

Purpose:

To collect, assess, and disseminate foreign intelligence. The Central Intelligence Agency is and always was what Congress thought it was creating for the first time with the DHS.

Where the CIA operates:

Exclusively on foreign soil.

Entire novel and TV series are premised on the notion that the CIA conducts elaborate surveillance and investigations of American citizens on American soil. (i.e. Homeland and Burn Notice). No. Even in the case of an internal investigation, such as the investigation of traitor Aldrich Ames, the agency must contact the FBI and/or the DHS—depending on the foreigner’s activities—as soon as surveillance on American soil is involved.

What the CIA is authorized to do:

The CIA is authorized to gather intelligence on foreign countries and foreign individuals outside of the US. It has its own employees, but it can also employ contractors and foreigners. Any combination of employees (a.k.a. blue badgers), contractors (a.k.a. green badgers), or foreign agents can be involved in an operation.

Power to arrest:

The CIA does not have the authority to arrest anyone. They do at times detain foreigners in the process of covert actions, but you didn’t hear that from us. The CIA never arrests people for the purpose of prosecution.

To arrest someone on foreign soil for the purpose of prosecution, the CIA cooperates with the FBI, who must in turn cooperate with the host country.

 

Islamabad house where Ramzi Yousef was captured. Image by US govt., public domain.

Islamabad house where Ramzi Yousef was captured.
Image by US govt., public domain.

 

An example of this interaction is the arrest of the first World Trade Center bomber, Ramzi Yousef, in Islamabad, Pakistan. A US State Department employee found the relevant lead by passing out thousands of matchbooks with a modest reward offer printed on the covers. He turned over the information to the CIA, which located Yousef and kept him under surveillance until an FBI team could arrive in Pakistan. The FBI executed a raid while the Islamabad Police waited outside the building. When the FBI brought Yousef out, the Islamabad Police performed the arrest and immediately turned him back to the FBI team to be escorted to New York for formal prosecution.

Oversight:

The CIA reports to the National Intelligence Director, who reports to the president. The agency is overseen by the Senate and House Intelligence Committees. As much as Congress and the president disavow their knowledge of CIA activities at times, the CIA has never operated without oversight from Congress and the White House.

 

Wiki 2015 Mar FBI Logo

 

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Purpose:

The FBI was originally the federal government’s investigative agency. Now, the FBI investigates both criminal and terrorist activities and has offices in several overseas US embassies.

Official priorities listed at the FBI website:

  1. Protect the United States from terrorist attack
  2. Protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage
  3. Protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes
  4. Combat public corruption at all levels
  5. Protect civil rights
  6. Combat transnational/national criminal organizations and enterprises
  7. Combat major white-collar crime
  8. Combat significant violent crime
  9. Support federal, state, local and international partners
  10. Upgrade technology to successfully perform the FBI’s mission

Unofficially, the FBI is tasked with keeping suit manufacturers in business.

 

Canstock photo of three actual FBI agents.

Canstock photo of three actual FBI agents.

 

Where the FBI operates:

The FBI operates inside the US as both an investigative and a law enforcement agency. Outside of the US, the FBI assists foreign governments in investigations and conducts investigations of crimes against Americans and American installations. It also acts as a liaison to foreign law enforcement agencies.

What the FBI is authorized to do:

The FBI is authorized to conduct law enforcement and surveillance inside the US. Outside the US, it relies on the CIA for surveillance and must obtain the permission and cooperation of foreign governments for any US law enforcement activities on their territory.

Power to arrest:

The FBI arrests people inside America and, with the cooperation of foreign governments, takes criminals abroad into custody.

Oversight:

The FBI answers to the Department of Justice. The president can and does speak directly to the bureau, and the attorney general and various congressional committees provide oversight.

 

Wiki 2015 Mar DHS Logo

 

Department of Homeland Security

Purpose:

We’re not sure they know, and if they do know, they’re not admitting it.

Law prevented the FBI and CIA from operating effectively to avert terrorism in the US in that the bureau and the agency weren’t allowed to share most of their information with each other. This could have been fixed with a few changes in law.

However, Congress, never one to do for a dollar what could be done for $38 billion dollars, created the DHS. Their intent in establishing the DHS was to set up an agency that could work with itself in order to prevent the next 9/11. Its original core mission was counter-intelligence in order to ensure a homeland that is safe and secure, whatever that means.

The DHS is still creating itself and being created by outside forces such as Congress and any given president. Since its inception, the department has grown to include FEMA, the Coast Guard, the Secret Service, ICE, Border Patrol, TSA, and more.

 

TSA agents in Boston. Image by DHS, public domain.

TSA agents in Boston.
Image by DHS, public domain.

 

Where the DHS operates:

DHS operates both inside the US and outside the US, supposedly with the cooperation of the CIA. That boundary is a grey area that has never quite been defined.

What the DHS can do:

The DHS can order surveillance on anyone inside the US for virtually any reason under the Patriot Act and its legal progeny. To spy on people outside the US, it relies on the NSA, the CIA, and other agencies.

Power to arrest:

Like the FBI, the DHS can arrest people in the US or abroad if it obtains the cooperation of the foreign country. Those arrested by the DHS in the US have all the rights they would have if arrested by any other US police body. If the DHS nabs someone overseas, that person will show up in the US judicial system.

Oversight:

DHS has full department status, unlike the FBI or the CIA. They have their own department head. It is a cabinet position that reports straight to the president and only nominally to the National Director of Intelligence.

 

Wiki 2015 Mar NSA Logo

National Security Agency/Central Security Service

Purpose:

Cryptology is at the core of the NSA/CSS. It’s the agency’s job to break foreign codes and set codes for the entire US government. It also listens to and stores foreign and domestic signals, including computer signals.

The NSA is very stingy at sharing what it gathers with other sectors of the intelligence community. Other intelligence organizations view the NSA as a black hole where information and money go in, and nothing comes out. In fact, it is undoubtedly the source of astronomers’ models of cosmological black holes.

Where the NSA operates:

Most NSA employees reside and operate inside the US, though they might travel to US embassies or foreign bases. Anywhere there are secured communications, the NSA has the authority to show up and investigate to make sure that security procedures are in place.

The NSA neither confirms nor denies having any facilities for gathering signals outside of the US.

What the NSA can do:

The NSA’s foreign and domestic intelligence gathering operations are not discussed, however, we would refer you to Piper’s PRISM articles listed below. Everyone in the NSA leadership serves at the pleasure of the president. As with the CIA, the president likes to pretend that he forgot that the NSA does what he tells it to do.

 

President Obama addressing NSA about mass surveillance on Jan 17, 2014, pretending he forgot that he ordered the mass surveillance in the first place. Image by US govt., public domain.

President Obama addressing NSA about mass surveillance on Jan 17, 2014, pretending he forgot that he ordered the mass surveillance in the first place.
Image by US govt., public domain.

 

Power to arrest:

The NSA doesn’t arrest anyone. Not ever. If someone shows up flashing an NSA badge, feel free to shoot them. They are a Hollywood crew and not NSA employees.

Oversight:

The question of NSA oversight has been afloat for many decades. They are supposed to report to the National Director of Intelligence and the CIA, but the CIA has never been satisfied with the NSA’s sharing of information.

Have you ever spotted fantastical activities on the part of the CIA, FBI, or NSA in fiction? Do you have any question about who gets to do what to whom in the real world?

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PRISM Surveillance on Americans—What Price Convenience?

PRISM—We Can’t Stop the Signal

Why PRISM Matters

Spooks Without Boundaries

NSA: Hoarders, Cheaters, Dr. Phil, or Jerry Springer?

America Is Not a Location–The Ultimate Price of Citizen Surveillance

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Coming in September!

THE SPY BRIDE Final Cover 3 inch

For Bayard & Holmes updates notice of releases, subscribe to the monthly Bayard & Holmes Covert Briefing.

America’s Future Low-Budget Bomber–When $550M Just Isn’t Enough

Bayard & Holmes

~ Jay Holmes

For the last six months American and foreign intelligence agencies have been reading about a new stealth bomber that is being developed for the US Air Force. Most of what has been published about the new plane has not been published by the Pentagon or the US Air Force, but rather by a variety of “defense experts” and “aviation writers.”

 

Canstock 2015 Aug Money going down the toilet

 

The US Air Force and Pentagon are suggesting a cost limit of $550,000,000 per new bomber.

I am not a bomber expert, so I am happy to disclose my limitations in assessing bomber development. I am not a bomber pilot or even a pilot at all. I have never served in the US Air Force or anyone else’s air force. I am not any type of aviation engineer, nor have I ever dated one. It’s fair to say that I am not an aviation expert.

My qualifications for having an opinion on the US Air Force’s new bomber program are thus:

  • I don’t have $550,000,000.00 to give the US Air Force to pay for each bomber, and I don’t know anyone that does.
  • I am a happy US taxpayer. I don’t mind paying taxes, but I want the money to be used efficiently.
  • In the past, I have been a casual consumer of valuable products and services offered by the US Air Force, along with Marine Corps and Naval Aviation groups.

So, from this limited perspective, I offer my response to the scarce actual information and abundant “expert” opinions that have been published about the next US Air Force bomber.

For ease of communication, let’s refer to the imaginary new bomber as the “FD”—short for Flying Deficit.

Aviation “experts” thus far all agree that the greatest challenge to producing FD bomber will be the unreasonably tight price limitation of $550,000,000 per plane. To mere mortals, the price tag sounds dizzyingly high. Count me with the mere mortals.

So what does it mean that so many “aviation experts” are in a state of “deep concern” over the $550,000,000 suggested retail value for each FD bomber?

Are all of us non-aviation experts confused about the value of cash? Do we all fail to understand how difficult it is to make something fly and drop stuff on people we don’t like? Perhaps we are not all that confused.

Let us first examine what is known about the FD bomber. We know next to nothing.

We know that it will be “stealth,” like the B-2 already is. We know that it will be built for both conventional and nuclear payloads, like the B-2 already is. And we know that it will include the defense industry’s most important buzzwords. Yes, it will be like my house and my car. It will be “net centric.” Let’s all cheer for “net centric.” It sounds so nice and must cost a bunch. Right?

 

B-2 Stealth Bomber Image by Dept. of Defense, public domain

B-2 Stealth Bomber
Image by Dept. of Defense, public domain

 

You might find it interesting that the “experts” that are concerned about the suggested budget limitation for the FD bomber have yet to review the US Air Force’s requirements for the FD. Without knowing what the US Air Force wants to buy, they are already certain that a $550,000,000 price tag means that the next bomber will not be the best technology on the best bomber. I’m heartbroken . . . Not really.

How can well educated, experienced aviation experts suggest that the FD bomber will be an underpriced failure when the US Air Force has yet to release the actual requirements for the project?

To understand the answer to that critical question we must first understand who these “experts” are. So far, as near as I have been able to determine, they are not “aviation experts” in the traditional sense. The “experts” publishing those articles are not aviation engineers, retired US Air Force bomber pilots, or US Air Force project managers. They are, in fact, people with degrees and expertise in marketing, communications, public relations, and sales.

I was not surprised to discover that members of the Chicken Little’s The Bomber is Falling Choral Group are not bomber experts.

They harmonize well, but they don’t appear to know much about aviation, the sky, or falling bombs. What I have not been able to determine is how many of these “experts” have received free pens, free lunches, free junkets, free prostitutes, jobs, etc., from corporations that are hoping to receive a share of the “bomber windfall.” Thus far, the two competing potential prime contractors are Northrup Grumman and a team comprised of Lockheed Martin and Boeing. As is always the case when we consider opinions on large government projects, we must consider the source.

As of the time of this article, the US is in debt to the tune of $18 trillion. That figure is increasing every day, but what’s a few hundred billion between friends?

So while we accumulate debt faster than teenagers can consume pizza or congressional aids can snort cocaine, we are being told that rather than questioning the high price tag for FD bomber, we should actually be apologizing to the defense industry for expecting them to produce an adequate bomber for a measly $550,000,000 each. Shame on us . . . Not really.

My best guess is that a bomber that costs $550,000,000 each leaves lots of cash for PR campaigns peddled as “expert opinions.” Before you are overcome by shame for making the US Air Force use such a low budget bomber, you might want to drop a line to your elected officials to ask them why this, and other future projects, and so many current projects, cost as much as they do. Efficiency in defense spending will not get better until we, the taxpayers, convince Congress that, unlike them, we are not so easily boondoggled.

The Fall of the Falcon and How Top Security Access Changed — Or Didn’t

By Jay Holmes

In the past two weeks, we looked at how two of America’s recent traitors, Christopher Boyce and Andrew Daulton Lee, developed from childhood friends into spies for the Soviet Union. See When Altar Boys Get Bored–The TRW National Security Disaster, and Why You Don’t Want Chemically-Enhanced Partners in Treason.

Top Secret Canstock

After their brief and all-too-productive careers as spies, Federal Marshals arrested Christopher Boyce and Andrew Daulton Lee in January, 1977. By May, they were convicted of espionage. Boyce was given a 40-year sentence. Due to his higher number of convictions and the fact that he had violated his parole from prior drug dealing convictions, Lee was given a life sentence.

The trial was markedly speedy. I’ve always wondered if the federal judges and prosecutors were in a hurry to get it done and out of the news as quickly as possible. There was plenty of embarrassment to go around, and too many taxpayers might have asked too many questions too loudly about how much tax money they were giving TRW to carelessly allow so much Top Secret information stroll out their door.

Boyce and Lee were clearly guilty of espionage and deserved the infamy that came their way. In my view, they deserved worse than they got. But Boyce never should have had access to the information that he sold to the Soviets in the first place. The sloppy practices that allowed Top Secret communications and telemetry codes to be so easily stolen deserved close scrutiny by the federal government. If any such scrutiny occurred, it happened very quietly and remains a remarkably well-guarded secret. Any ramifications to TRW Corporation, the NSA, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the CIA—if they occurred at all—were far better hidden than all of the Top Secret data in their collective care.

Boyce and Lee started serving their sentences at Terminal Island federal prison in California.  After a while, Boyce was moved to a jail in San Diego. I assume that the move was to make it easier for investigators to do follow up interrogations, as they were never certain that they had the full story. Counter Intelligence agents in the FBI and CIA likely wondered if there were even more spies at TRW.

On July 10, 1979, Boyce was transferred to a federal prison in Lompoc, California. Neither Boyce nor Lee was fond of prison life. The social status of a convicted traitor in prison is close to that of a pedophile. Life was appropriately unpleasant for them at the bottom of the prison social ladder.

Boyce was smart enough and patient enough to carefully plan an escape. He took up jogging and ran laps to build his endurance. On January 21, 1980, Boyce escaped from Lompoc prison. He ran all night to gain as much distance as possible. He stole some clothes from a clothes line and managed to elude capture.

After Boyce’s escape, Lee was moved to a higher security federal prison in Marion, Illionos.  Lee claims that that ended his “friendship” with Boyce.

Now free but on the lamb, Boyce faced serious challenges. How would he escape the notice of alert passerbys or the occasional FBI agents and US Marshals that he might run in to in his day? How would he eat? Boyce’s one career skill, the “my FBI daddy got me this job” option, was no longer available to him.

Boyce started on a new career in bank robbery as the cornerstone of his financial planning. He befriended a single mom with a strong anti-establishment, anti-social outlook, and she became his bank robbing assistant.

Generally, bank robbers plan and execute profitable enough robberies to net enough cash to keep them from having to take the risk too often. Bank robbery is a dangerous crime. It can easily escalate to multiple murders, which then attract the interest of major law enforcement assets such as the FBI and state police. Bank robberies in Western states have an additional risk. Sometimes an impatient customer doesn’t like having his busy schedule interrupted by a snotty little bank robber, and he simply pulls a weapon and shoots the crook. Unfortunately, Boyce never robbed a bank that I happened to be standing in, so I never got the chance to shoot him. Neither did anyone else.

Boyce and his pickup team of latter day bank robbers may not have been too clear on the best model for successful heists, but they managed to rob 17 banks without being killed or captured. I have to give them credit for getting away with their hides intact.

Boyce developed the alias of “Anthony Edward Lester.” He knew he couldn’t live as a fugitive in the US forever, so he took flying lessons and planned to fly to the Soviet Union. He naively believed that the KGB would offer him an active commission as an officer in the Soviet military.

The USSR always maintained reputable training facilities for military officers. They turned out well-trained, intelligent officers, and Boyce would not have been given any sort of real commission. Might they have given him some cute medals and certificates to hang on the limited wall space of a small apartment in Moscow? Sure. Would they have given him a manuscript to sign off on and then publish it for him? You bet they would have. Would the Soviets have been so dumb as to treat Boyce like a real adult and make him an active officer in the KGB or Soviet military? Unfortunately, they were always smarter than that. The Soviets would have probably propped him up for propaganda purposes, but his life in the USSR would have been little better than life in a federal prison in the US.

As Boyce slowly increased his piloting skills, the FBI and US Marshals Service were each conducting “manhunts” for him and closing in. In August of 1981, the feds received a viable tip from one of Boyce’s  bank robbery teammates that Boyce was in Port Angeles, Washington. A task force of eighteen US Marshals, six FBI agents, and a US Border Patrol agent was formed and began a systematic investigation in Port Angeles.

On August 21, 1981, two US Marshals pulled into a drive-in restaurant, The Pit Stop. There sat Christopher Boyce. The temptation to immediately draw down on him must have been intense. The Marshals were calm and disciplined. They called for back-up. Once they had five agents in place, they arrested Boyce. Boyce received another conviction for his escape and was returned to prison.

In recent years, both Boyce and Lee were paroled. Their life as spies is over, but questions remain about their cases. Why was there apparently no negative consequence to the people at TRW who were responsible for the handling and security of the Top Secret information? TRW has since been involved in other scandals, including illegal dumping of dangerous chemicals and hazardous work place practices. They and many other companies with histories of shabby security practices remain beneficiaries of multibillion dollar defense and intelligence contracts.

TRW in Asia

Boyce and Lee were amateurs. Lee all but begged to be caught. But were there other and more sober employees at TRW and other contractors that remain at large? Since 9-11, we have seen sweeping changes in law enforcement and politics. The US Congress and the past and present Presidents all claim a desperate need for more invasive domestic surveillance in order that we might survive one more day. And yet we have the same open borders and the same sloppy handling of our own top secrets.

As I send this article to my fearless warrior-editor, TRW and other federal contractors are in a legal fight over alleged improper bidding practices by TRW in its attempt to gain yet another huge contract for the next generation of US spy satellites. It is my considered opinion that what occurred at TRW in the 70s could still be happening there today, and at any other contractor that handles secret information for the US government. Private Bradley Manning has demonstrated that it can just as easily still be happening with government employees, as well.

Remember the old saying about closing the barn door after the horse has escaped?  The Falcon has long fallen, and the Snowman melted, but in our ever-increasing zeal to know everything about every citizen, have we even bothered to close the barn door?  I hope I am wrong, but I don’t think so.