Timeline Oman–What Comes After Sultan Qaboos?

Bayard & Holmes

~ Jay Holmes

 

January 10, 2020 marks the passing of Sultan Qaboos bin Said al Said, the man who led Oman, the “other” Arabic country, for the past fifty years. We say the “other” Arabic country because by the standards of the region, Oman is a peaceful and happy place to live, which is something we can seldom say about that oil-rich corner of the world we call the Middle East. To understand a little about why Oman is not living up to the standards of mayhem and human suffering that most observers take for granted in that part of the world, it’s worth taking a glance at Oman’s history. We’ll do that with a timeline.

 

Image by CIA, public domain

OMAN HISTORICAL TIMELINE

6000 BC

Fire pit evidence indicates that people have arrived in Oman and stayed long enough to make a fire and eat a meal.

 

5000 BC

Non-nomads build fishing villages on the coast of Oman.

 

4500 BC

Pottery is produced in Oman.

 

2500 BC

Omani miners smelt copper, and Omani merchants set up trade with Mesopotamian trade ships. Copper is worth stealing, so concurrent with copper production and trade, large fortress construction starts in Oman to protect both mining and coastal areas.

 

2500 BC – 1300 BC

Oman continues to export copper and increases its boat making and seafaring skills as its neighbors evolve imperial domains such as Samaria and Ur. The increased sea trade to and from the Arabian Gulf benefits Oman.

 

1300 BC

Oman enters its iron age. Trade and wealth increase at a slow, but consistent rate.

 

1000 BC

Oman builds extensive irrigation ditches and, in doing so, becomes more “urban” as villages are able to support higher populations and develop more specialized skills. The irrigation technology may have been obtained from Persian immigrants. Oman begins to produce incense in commercial quantities for export.

 

300 BC

Wealth continues to accumulate in Oman. A classical period begins and sees an increase in commerce and art.

 

150 BC

Triliths are produced with inscriptions that remain undeciphered. The three stone structures are built in the interior of Oman in the frankincense-producing areas.

 

700 AD

Sultan Qaboos Mosque, Moscat, Oman
Image from CanstockPhotos

Bedouin Arabs enter Oman in greater number and bring Islam. Omani scholar Abu al-Sha’tha Jabir ibn Zayd al-Zahrani al-Azdi develops a moderate form of Islam known as “Ibadiyah,” which remains popular in Oman today. The Ibadi Muslims decide that while the Imam enjoys a high degree of control over the people, the people may vote to elect the Imam of their choice. The followers are entitled to impeach an Imam any time they decide to by simply voting to impeach him.

This is a notion that remains repulsive to modern-day Wahabis in Saudi Arabia, Shia junta members in Iran, Taliban thugs in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda and ISIS leaders, and despots of any flavor throughout the world.

This great scholar died in 711 AD, but his birth date is unknown. Thank you Jabir ibn Zayd al-Azid. Your influence is still felt today in Oman and in the Gulf. R.I.P.

 

1500 AD

Portugal becomes interested in the Gulf region and seeks to control trade throughout the area. Portugal uses amphibious tactics to attack, sack, and occasionally capture various ports in southern Arabia and in eastern Africa.

 

1508 AD

Afonso d’Albuquerque conquers the critical port city of Muscat on the coast of Oman.

 

1518 AD

In a well-executed campaign, Afonso captures Hormuz and throttles non-Portuguese trade through the Gulf of Arabia.

 

1650 AD

The Iberian Empire is busy throughout the world and is unable to reinforce Portuguese forces in Oman. The Portuguese are evicted, but they do not all leave. Many Omanis had established cordial relations with the Portuguese, and some of their descendants remain today as a distinct ethnic group in Oman. They are allowed to practice Christianity unmolested by the Islamic majority.

 

1700 AD

The Omani Sultanate is powerful enough to extend its reach and build a large fort on the island of Zanzibar off the coast of Tanzania in East Africa. Oman becomes a major slave trading area.

Oman builds two distinct cultures. The inland Omanis are more conservative and isolationist, but continue to practice moderate Islam. The coastal Omanis develop a more international view and a more international culture. The differences in culture cause strife at times.

Oman gains a three hundred square mile colony in the Gwadar Peninsula in what is now modern day Pakistan. Gwadar prospers due to pearl diving and a particularly lucrative slave trade that sends Persian and Central Asian women to Arabia for high prices.

 

1815 AD

When Britain tires of Wahabi Arab pirates taking British East India Company ships, Oman and Egypt side with the British and conduct a successful campaign against the Wahabi pirates.

 

1834 AD

Oman has strong, friendly ties with the United States of America as well as Great Britain. President Andrew Jackson has special silver dollars minted for the Sultan of Oman.

 

1840 AD

The Sultan of Oman moves his seat of government to Old Fort in Zanzibar.

During the remainder of the 19th century, questions of dynastic succession and competition between Imams in the interior of Oman keep Oman busy and detract from trade profits.

 

1907 AD

Great Britain heavily influences Omani politics and forces Oman to end the practice of slavery. In the early decades of the 1900s, the more conservative interior Omanis gain a degree of autonomy from the less conservative government of Oman.

 

1954 AD

A new Imam comes to power in the interior of Oman and attempts to reject the central control of the Omani government. With the help of the British, Oman’s central government defeats the Imam in 1957.

In particular, the British Special Air Service made tremendous contributions in dealing with the rebels in the dry mountains of the interior. The Saudi government had clandestinely supported the rebels and continued to do so after their defeat. The Saudis and other Arab states did not abandon the unprofitable effort until the 1980s. Oman will likely not forget the Saudi support for the Islamic rebels for a long time.

 

1964 AD

Soviet-backed rebels operating out of South Yemen attempt to generate a communist rebellion in Oman. The communist rebels prove to be more adept at controlling their Soviet controllers than the controllers are at controlling their insurgents. The rebellion eventually dies in 1975.

 

1965 AD

Oil is discovered in Oman.

 

1967 AD

Oil production begins in Oman.

 

Sultan Qaboos of Oman, May 21, 2013
Image US State Dept., public domain

1970 AD

Qaboos bin Said Al Said conducts a bloodless coup against his father, Sultan Said bin Taimur.

Qaboos was educated in India and England. He was a graduate of Sandhurst Military Academy and, unlike Moammar Gadhafi, the Academy staff remembers Qaboos attending and graduating. Qaboos served in the British Army in a Scottish regiment and was posted to Germany for a year. After leaving the British Army, he continued his studies in England and traveled widely.

Qaboos introduces liberal reforms and forms a council to be elected by business leaders and prominent citizens.

1979 AD

Oman is the only government of an Islamic-majority nation that recognizes Anwar Sadat’s peace treaty with Israel.

 

1984 AD

Oman joins the new Gulf Cooperation Council, along with the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. The forming of the council is symbolic of the Gulf States deciding to bury their differences in favor of a united defense against Iranian military threats.

 

1986 AD

Oman’s first university opens. Emphasis is placed on science and on training teachers and nurses.

 

1990 AD

Sultan Qaboos announces a modern constitution which includes basic human rights for its citizens.

 

1996 AD

A census of Oman indicates a population of about two million.

 

2000 AD

Approximately 100,000 Omanis are allowed to participate in the selection of an 83-member council that will act as a “lower house” in a bicameral central government. Two women are elected. The Sultan selects the 48-member “upper house” and includes five women in the council.

 

2005 AD

An Omani court convicts thirty-one Islamic radicals of attempting a coup.

 

2012 AD

The history of Oman has resulted in a country that, while surrounded by anti-democratic governments and xenophobic cultures, has remained open to outsiders. Oman keeps cordial communications with Iran, and when Western governments wish to speak to the Iranian religious junta, they often do so through Omani diplomats. Western travelers have rarely encountered trouble in Oman. Islamic radicals are a small, shrinking minority and are not well-tolerated by the majority of the people or by the government. Oman makes no effort to stop anyone from practicing any religion. The minority Hindus and Catholics mix socially and professionally with their Islamic neighbors with no sign of segregation or hostilities. Neither the government nor the people of Oman have any interest in Islamic radicalism or any other fad in despotism.

At this point, Oman is a country trying to survive its radical neighbors while preparing itself for the loss of oil revenues that will occur in this decade. It is diversifying its economy. A major natural gas processing plant and port facility is being constructed with the help of British and American engineers. Since Sultan Qaboos came to power, education has grown rapidly, and literacy is at eighty-two percent and rising. Compared to Detroit and many other cities in the United States, these folks are Ivy League elitists.

Under Sultan Qaboos, Oman still had problems with unemployment, but protests were small, involving less than two hundred protesters. On one occasion, at least one protester was killed by a rubber bullet that struck him in the head. Qaboos responded by agreeing to more reforms and more jobs. The protesters in Oman under Qaboos were too few in number, and they did not appear to have any popular support.

 

March 2013 AD

Sultan Qaboos announced pardons for thirty-two anti-government protestor organizers and activists who had been convicted in 2012.

 

May 19, 2014 AD

In a landmark case, Oman’s former commerce minister Muhammad bin Nasir Al-Khusaibi was convicted of corruption. He was sentenced to three years in prison and a one million dollar fine for receiving bribes for construction work on the new Muscat International Airport. Former Omani Undersecretary for Transport and Communication Mohammed Al-Amri was also convicted of corruption concerning the same airport construction fiasco. He was sentenced to prison for three years and fined $3.1 million. For government officials anywhere in the Arabian peninsula to be held accountable for corruption is highly unusual and a hopeful sign for Oman’s future.

August 10, 2016 AD

Three journalists of the private Omani national newspaper Azaman were arrested for publishing an article alleging inappropriate government pressure on judges. The government claimed that the allegations were false and slanderous. Critics saw it as evidence that Oman lacks anything approaching free speech for journalism. Government supporters claimed that the newspaper was engaged in anti-government propaganda on behalf of foreigners. The Western media ignored the case.

 

June 2017 AD

In the midst of Qatar’s continuing political conflict with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, Oman allowed Qatar to use Omani ports to transfer cargo, thus bypassing sea, land, and air transport restrictions imposed on Qatar by its neighboring Gulf States.

 

October 5, 2017

The Omani Supreme Court ruled against the Azaman newspaper and ordered it permanently closed.

 

October 25, 2017 AD

New members of the consultative Majlis Ash’shura were elected. Several women campaigned for office, but only one woman was selected.

 

2019 AD

The government of Oman spoke openly about financial problems caused by the continued low oil prices. Oman’s credit ratings declined.

 

January 10, 2020 AD

Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said passed away. Sultan Qaboos’s cousin Haitham bin Tariq Al Said was sworn in as the new Sultan of Oman.

 

January 11, 2020 AD

In his first address to Oman, Sultan Haitham bin Tariq announced that he intended to continue with Oman’s long tradition of peaceful and moderate foreign policy, and that he intends to develop new economic programs to help Oman out of its current economic difficulties. Tariq is Oxford educated and has a reputation for being moderate, honest, and exceptionally intelligent. He has two decades of experience in quiet diplomacy on behalf of Sultan Qaboos and is well respected by foreign policy experts around the world.

Sultan Haitham bin Tariq faces great challenges.

On Oman’s southwestern border, Iranian-backed terrorists are fighting a brutally violent war with a weak Saudi-backed Yemeni government. On their northwestern border, Oman’s neighbors in the United Arab Emirates are facing new internal opposition. Twenty miles from Oman’s northern-most islands, the radical Iranian government continues to support terror groups across the region. Tariq will have to continue to skillfully handle Oman’s foreign policy while improving Oman’s economy. For the moment, he has wide support from Omanis.

Tariq also has one very important ace up his sleeve.

Oman has a new and vast refinery and port facility at Duqm on the Indian Ocean. The port facilities are continuing to grow, and China and several Western logistics companies have signed agreements with Oman for access to the new port. The Duqm port is quite valuable, as it will allow China and Western countries to access Gulf oil and natural gas supplies without having to venture near Iran’s coast or pass through the Straits of Hormuz. At the same time, dry goods from the West can be offloaded in Duqm and continue overland to the Gulf States. Duqm is a rare instance where China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and Europe all find themselves on the same side of an important development. While the United States is currently a net oil exporter, any development that reduces Iran’s ability to threaten the world’s oil trade is good news.

The sooner the massive new Duqm port can increase its cargo traffic, the sooner Tariq will be able to stabilize Oman’s economy. Holmes’s best guess is that Sultan Tariq will succeed in improving Oman’s economy and will keep Oman independent and moderate.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

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SPYCRAFT: The Good, the Bad, & the Booty, Key Figures in Espionage

Hollywood has yet to produce either heroes or villains that can match the heights and depths of humanity. Who is more courageous than a one-legged woman, “the most dangerous spy in all of France,” operating in Nazi-occupied territory? Who is more extraordinary than a young man left for dead, not worth a Viet Cong bullet, who survives to hunt down terrorists for six more decades? Who is more heroic than a homeless child living in a cardboard box who grows up to be an iconic showgirl, an espionage legend, and a tireless humanitarian? And what villain is more malevolent than the traitor that lurks in our midst, walking our halls and eating at our tables, while helping our enemies murder our own and butcher thousands of innocents?

Join us as we explore the lives of these espionage elites and others who prove that “we’re only human” is not an excuse to fail, but a reason to succeed.

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Shifting Sands in the House of Saud

Bayard & Holmes

~ Jay Holmes

Since Fahd ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Āl Sa’ūd ascended to the throne of Saudi Arabia in 1982, relations between the West and Saudi Arabia have been fairly stable, if somewhat complicated.

 

Secy of Defense William Cohen (left)
and King Fahd ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz Āl Sa’ūd (right)
October 13, 1998
Image by Dept of Defense, public domain

 

The Saudi government has remained consistently willing to maintain close diplomatic, business, and military ties with the US and other Western nations. At the same time, it has supported Wahhabi religious leaders in maintaining extremely conservative Sunni religious dominance over Saudi citizens. While the West enabled technological and business modernizations in Saudi Arabia, the Saudi government to a great extent allowed the Wahhabi religious leaders to define culture in their country.

Saudi Arabia’s dichotomy of petroleum-fueled modernization versus conservative Wahhabi cultural control has been somewhat baffling to Westerners from democratic nations.

In spite of these constantly conflicting forces, King Fahd managed to maintain a stable balance. From the US point of view, the Saudi Arabian government was one of two allies in the region, Israel being the other. Yet while relations between Riyadh and Washington remained warm, not all Saudis felt that warmth toward the US or the West. In fact, Saudi Arabia, thanks to Wahhabi influence, remained a breeding ground for violent jihadism.

Fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 attackers hailed from Saudi Arabia, and wealthy Saudi Arabians have consistently been a leading source for terrorist funding. Yet the oil flowed to the West while Western cash fueled the extended Royal family’s lavish lifestyle. That oil wealth also fueled vast social programs and a bloated civil government that makes our US government seem almost efficient by comparison.

In 1993, King Fahd sent shockwaves through Saudi society when he instituted a sixty person consultative council.

All the members of the council were picked by him. It was nothing like “elected representation,” but by Saudi standards, but it was a huge step forward for Saudi society. Two years later, twenty women were allowed to attend the consultative council. To Westerners, it might seem like a miniscule token step toward liberalization, but to the Wahhabi religious leaders, it was wild heresy.

King Fahd suffered a major stroke in 1995. His brother, Crown Prince Abdullah, acted as his regent and unofficial prime minister. When Fahd died in 2005, Abdullah ascended the throne and continued the balancing act.

 

King Abdullah bin Abdul al-Saud, January 2007
Image by Cherie A. Thurlby,
Dept. of Defense, public domain

 

Like his predecessors, Abdullah was willing to use the Wahhabi establishment to maintain order and enforce their version of Sharia law in his Kingdom, but like every Saudi King, he was leery of their power. He continued to use oil wealth to further drive modernization and hold up vast social welfare programs while simultaneously struggling with the domestic terror issues caused by the radical Wahhabi influence.

Gradually, King Abdullah implemented small steps toward liberalizing Saudi society.

In 2007, he banned the infamous religious police from making arrests and began to institute major judicial reforms. Two years later, Abdullah pushed ahead with reforms and fired most of the senior judges and leaders of the religious police system.

In 2011 the Arab Spring swept across North Africa and the Mid-East. When it reached Saudi Arabia, it was quickly stifled by police action.

To outsiders, it may have appeared to be simple oppression, but inside the kingdom, there was genuine fear that Al Qaeda and their many clones would hijack any Arab Spring. There was also concern that Iranian-backed Shia minorities in Saudi Arabia would agitate on behalf of the Iranian Ayatollahs. King Abdullah responded by announcing increases in social welfare programs in the hope of appeasing many of the potential “Springers.”

In September of 2011, King Abdullah announced that women would be allowed to vote in municipal elections and run for office. While Saudi women were quietly celebrating their newfound empowerment, the Saudi courts sentenced a woman to ten lashes for driving a car. King Abdullah overturned the verdict.

In 2013, while Saudi Arabia continued to struggle to control domestic terrorism by homegrown jihadists, King Abdullah appointed thirty women to the consultative council.

The following year, fearful of Iranian-backed insurgents in Yemen and the simmering unrest of the Shia-backed majority in Bahrain, King Abdullah did an about face in policy and introduced strict anti-terror laws.

The new laws give the police the power to arrest anyone that protests against or speaks against the Saudi government or the Wahhabi religious establishment. The law even prohibits “thoughts” against the government or Wahhabi Islam.

When King Abdullah died in January of 2015, his brother, Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, ascended the throne.

 

Saudi Arabian executions graph
Image by Runab, wikimedia commons.

 

Though Salman had supported King Abdullah’s reforms he was already eighty years old and in declining health. Instead of appointing one of his aging brothers as his acting regent, he appointed his thirty year old son, Mohammed bin Salman al Saud, as deputy crown prince and defense minister. The choice may prove to be an exceptionally bad one.

Unlike his father and uncles, Mohammed bin Salman was educated in Saudi Arabia rather than in the US, and he is not well travelled. He has a reputation for arrogance and ruthlessness.

Salman and his son face the same challenges that King Abdullah faced, but they lack one important resource that King Abdullah and his predecessors always relied on . . . They lack the cash. Oil prices have been down for the last couple of years, and that has forced the Saudi government to reduce the allowances of the extended royal family and to reverse the increases in social welfare programs that helped calm the attempted Saudi Arabian Spring.

The fear in the house of Saud is showing.

The new anti-terrorism laws are being rigorously enforced. Executions are at a two-decade high. There were 150 public beheadings in 2015. In the first week of 2016 alone, there were 47 executions by beheading or firing squad.

 

Human Rights Activist Samar Badawi
Image from Int’l Women of Courage Awards 2012,
Dept. of State, public domain

 

In addition, popular blogger, Raif Badawi, who urged Saudi society to be more liberal and secular, was imprisoned in 2013 and sentenced to 10 years and 1000 lashes. His lawyer, Wahleed Abu al-Khair, was imprisoned in 2014. Now, Samar Badawi – Raif Badawi’s sister and al-Khair’s former wife – was arrested on January 12, 2016, along with her 2-year-old daughter. A long time human rights advocate, Samar Badawi’s crime was running a Twitter account to raise awareness of al-Khair’s situation. At this rate, the Saudis might have to use any money left over from their campaign in Yemen and their weapons acquisitions to fund new prison construction.

On top of the domestic strain, on January 2, 2016, the Saudi execution of a prominent Shiite cleric led to an Iranian mob storming the Saudi Embassy in Tehran. Iran and Saudi Arabia then severed diplomatic ties.

The current generation of Saudi leaders is under pressure, and it shows.

The growing influence of Iran in the new Shia government in Iraq, the Iranian-backed rebellion in Yemen, the rise of ISIL in Syria, the increased Russian military presence in Syria, all combine to present what the young Saudis likely perceive to be a menace to their rule and their physical survival. When they add to that the American and Western “accord” with Iran, they may see themselves as being isolated while facing unrest at home and increasing threats by Iran.

So where will the young Royals take Saudi Arabia?

Mohammed bin Salman is planning major economic reforms. He will have to implement those reforms while dealing with Saudi Arabia’s expensive support for Sunni (non-ISIL) rebels in Yemen, the war in Yemen, and the brewing opposition at home.

 

King Ibn Saud & President Franklin D. Roosevelt
Great Bitter Lake, Egypt, 2-14-1945
Image public domain

 

In 1928, King Ibn Saud came to power on the back of a fierce Wahhabi tiger. The house of Saud has never been able to completely dismount from that tiger. Since 1928, governing in Saudi Arabia has required an acrobatic balance of Wahhabi interests versus Saudi national interests. The future of Saudi Arabia depends on how well Mohammed bin Salman can ride that tiger.

 

 

 

 

ISIS–Who Are the Players, and Where Do They Stand?

By Jay Holmes

This week, ISIS remains a major news item. For the sake of continuity, we will continue referring to them as ISIS, but be aware that, in recent weeks, they have acquired more aliases than the average Brooklyn mob goon.

 

ISIS logo
public domain, wikimedia commons

 

Since their defeat at the hands of the lightly armed but well organized Kurds of northern Iraq, ISIS has focused on training, recruiting, and re-establishing their local dominance in Syria. Even if ISIS were forced to retreat from all of Iraq, that would be of secondary importance to them as compared to maintaining their strongholds in Syria.

Where does Iraq stand?

The success of the Iraqi Kurds, with assistance from U.S. air support, was no surprise to anyone who knows or has studied the Kurds. It remains to be seen how well the Iraqi National Army will capitalize on the U.S. and allied airstrikes to recapture ISIS-held areas in their country. With Maliki no longer in charge in Iraq, and with so many Shia Iraqis rediscovering their long forgotten love of U.S. firepower, the ISIS offensive in Iraq is stalled for the moment.

If the new Iraqi government can deliver a closer approximation of “functioning government” than Maliki did, then Iraq should be able to eventually push ISIS forces out of their country. However, no amount of U.S. or anti-ISIS coalition airstrikes will push ISIS out of Iraq completely unless Iraqis take some responsibility for saving themselves by fielding a credible army and establishing and maintaining a functioning administration.

 

F/A-18E Super Hornet on Deck of U.S.S. George H.W. Bush
image by U.S. Navy, public domain

 

More recently, the U.A.E., Jordon, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar joined in coordinated airstrikes against ISIS bases and assets in their Syrian strongholds. Aircraft from Belgium and Denmark also joined in strikes in Iraq. Simultaneously, the U.S. stepped up aid to non-ISIS anti-Assad rebels in Syria. The trick is—and long has been—to assist the legitimate indigenous freedom fighters of Syria without accidentally funding and equipping ISIS or any “Ali come lately” ISIS wannabes.

What does ISIS mean to the Gulf States?

Fortunately, the Gulf States are now exercising more discretion in how they fund and arm anti-Assad groups in Syria. For most Gulf Sates, enemies of the Shia Iranians are their natural friends. In the case of ISIS, the supposed “friends” have become an even greater danger to their former benefactors in the Gulf than the danger presented by the Shia theocracy in Iran.

Even if all outside financing of ISIS were halted, and it pretty well has been, ISIS would not be bankrupt. For the last few months, they have skillfully built a strong economy based on violent tax collection, bank robbery, and oil sales. Note that the recent coalition airstrikes against ISIS included oil refineries as priority targets. Destroying ISIS oil export operations has the added advantage of making the Gulf States happy to participate in the air campaign. Anything that drives up oil prices is good news for the Gulf States.

 

Map of coalition airstrikes on Syrian oil refineries
September 24, 2014
image by Department of Defense, public domain

 

How do the airstrikes benefit the coalition members?

While ISIS bases are being destroyed, ISIS is less able to plan and conduct effective terrorist strikes against its enemies. In the ISIS reality, its enemies, real or imagined, can be roughly defined as the non-ISIS segment of the human population. If nothing else, we can appreciate that ISIS is consistent and predictable. If it lives, and it is not ISIS, they want it dead.

Where is France in all of this?

During the last week, France made a moderate effort at conducting independent airstrikes against ISIS. It is not in the nature of French politicians to place their troops, ships, or planes under foreign control, so French efforts might remain independent and somewhat uncoordinated with US-led airstrikes. It’s possible that the French Air Force and Navy are quietly receiving refueling support, reconnaissance, and intelligence from U.S. forces. If that is so, it’s best that it happen quietly so that French voters can view French airstrikes as being a strictly French affair. Call it “Operation Les Belles Artes” if you like. As long as the bombs drop on suitable ISIS targets, it doesn’t much matter who dropped them or which national anthem they were humming at the time.

What are our allies in the U.K. doing?

Having settled the critical question of Scottish secession, the U.K. government turned some attention back toward ISIS. David Cameron called for the U.K. to join in airstrikes against the group, and it has done so to a minimal degree.

How is Syria’s largest neighbor, Turkey, reacting to the “ISIS crisis”?

The Turkish position is somewhat complex. Turkish President Recep Erdogan can see both potential opportunities and potential disasters in the ISIS crisis, and Erdogan is highly skilled at envisioning potential disasters.

The potential benefit of ISIS to Turkey comes from the fact that ISIS hates Iran. The group has destabilized the already-pretty-unstable pro-Iranian Iraqi government.

 

Map of airstrike areas in Iraq
image by JhonsJoe, CC3.0

 

One of the potential disasters is already manifesting itself in the form of hundreds of thousands of refugees flooding into Turkey. Some of those refugees are Syrian Kurds, and Erdogan’s secret target number of Kurds in Turkey is zero. Rather than having more Kurds moving into Turkey, Erdogan would prefer to get rid of the independence-minded Kurds that are already there. And yet, these refugees are close cousins of the Iraqi Kurds that are willing to export oil to and through Turkey.

ISIS captured over forty Turkish diplomats during its summer blitzkrieg in Iraq. On most days in the ISIS universe, Turks are “filthy western lapdogs.” Yet, rather than staging the usual “ISIS entertainment hour” publicly broadcasted beheadings of their Turkish prisoners, ISIS released them. Why? Western observers are asking what deal Erdogan might have made with the devil to secure the safe return of his diplomats. My suspicion is that any deal was likely brokered through Erdogan’s friends in Qatar and might have involved oil. However, in truth, Turkey needs ISIS to be defeated nearly as urgently as Iraq and the Assad regime in Syria do.

The view from my kitchen window here in the U.S. is different from the view from Turkey. I cannot see ISIS from my house. Erdogan, on the other hand, sees ISIS standing right past his border crossings with Syria. He needs the Sunni fundamentalists vanquished far more than we do, but when we decide that ISIS has been suppressed enough for our liking, we will stop bombing them, and they will still be across the border from Turkey.

Given the basic ISIS tenet that everyone outside of their direct control is their mortal enemy, it’s likely that any deals that Erdogan might have made with the devil will be null and void once the bombs stop falling on ISIS heads. As he so often does, Erdogan missed the easy play. ISIS will never be a friend to Turkey. In the long run, Erdogan further damaged Turkey’s relationship with its supposed NATO allies without obtaining any long-term benefit for his country.

 

U.S. Marines constructing Kurdish refugee camp
image by Department of Defense, public domain

 

What is the Syrian point of view?

The Assad regime is grateful for the tactical windfall being delivered by its distant enemies against the closer and more immediately threatening ISIS forces in Syria and Lebanon. However, Assad and his gang cannot express any happiness with the U.S. or its allies. From the Syrian point of view, while ISIS is a threat to the Assad regime, once ISIS is substantially defeated, the Assad gang would be the next obvious target.

So what can we see in the crystal ball?

My best guess is that Gulf States will remain willing to cooperate just long enough to save themselves from ISIS. As the casualties mount for ISIS, the ISIS leaders will try to understand why their We Will Kill You All publicity campaign has failed them. If their current gangster-in-chief and/or enough of his closest pals are killed, ISIS might transform itself into a more publicity-friendly criminal enterprise and survive under some new name with a slightly less visible agenda of hate and destruction. When the dust from the bombs settles, the region will still be a hellish mess, but we in the West might succeed in avoiding or blunting major terrorist strikes by ISIS. If we can do so without investing more ground forces in the region, then we can declare a victory before moving on to the next “catastrophe du jour.”

Another Day, Another Battle–The Israeli Counter-Attack on Hamas

By Jay Holmes

In April of 2014, Hamas, which governs the Palestinian Gaza Strip, and Fatah, which governs the Palestinian areas of the West Bank, agreed to make peace and form a unity government. Predictably, Israel reacted negatively to the Hamas-Fatah reconciliation. Israel viewed it as a victory for radicalism and terrorism within the Palestinian camp.

 

Woman holding Hamas flag.
Unaltered image by Kimdime.

 

The governments of China, the EU, India, Turkey, and the USA joined the UN in agreeing to negotiate with the new Hamas-Fatah unity government. These countries and organizations announced their agreement to work with the Hamas-Fatah union in spite of the fact that Hamas has not waivered from its stated central goal of annihilating Israel and converting all of Palestine, including what is now Israel, into a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist state. This was particularly odd on the part of the EU and the USA, since those governments had previously been very clear in declaring Hamas to be a terror organization.

After the EU and the USA announced their acceptance of the new Hamas-Fatah union, Israel became less receptive toward EU/USA brokered peace negotiations. From the Israeli point of view, the EU and the USA could easily afford to trust the new Palestinian unity government because rockets from Gaza and terrorist attacks originating in Gaza and the West Bank would not be targeting either of them. The new Palestinian government took power on June 2, 2014.

On June 12, three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped from the West Bank. At the same time, the number of Hamas’s rocket attacks from Gaza into Israel increased sharply. The Israeli Air Force responded to the increased rocket attacks by launching air strikes against Hamas targets in Gaza.

 

Israel Defense Forces searching for kidnapped teens near Hebron.
Unaltered image by Israel Defense Forces.

 

Hamas did not claim the kidnappings of the three teens. The culpability for that action lies with Hamas’s affiliated terror group, Qawasameh. However, not wanting to miss an opportunity to pursue its favorite pastime of shooting itself in the foot, Hamas loudly applauded the kidnappings of the three Israeli children. Evidence indicates that Hamas had supplied weapons and cash to Qawasameh to conduct these kidnappings and murders.

The kidnappings and Hamas’s gloating about them have served to silence the voices of reconciliation within Israel. On June 30, the dead bodies of the three kidnapped Israeli teens were found near Hebron. The Israeli government came under increasing pressure from its citizens to act against the kidnappers. In July, Israel rounded up Hamas leaders and some of their affiliated terrorist pals in the West Bank.

On July 17, Israel and Hamas agreed to a five-hour humanitarian ceasefire for the purpose of delivering food and medicine to Gaza. After the ceasefire ended, the Israeli Army entered Gaza with the stated purpose of destroying tunnels that served Hamas and other terrorist groups as weapons depots and passages for terrorist raids into Israel from Gaza. The Israelis claim that they found evidence indicating plans to use the tunnels for a massive, coordinated terrorist strike against Israel in September of this year.

 

Tunnel under Gaza Strip
Unaltered image by Israel Defense Force.

 

On August 1, the EU and the USA announced that they had negotiated a 72-hour humanitarian ceasefire to assist the thousands of wounded Palestinians in Gaza. About an hour into the ceasefire, Hamas fighters demonstrated their usual lack of concern for the Palestinians in Gaza by attacking Israeli Army forces and negating the ceasefire.

On August 3, the Israeli Army announced that it had destroyed most of the known Hamas tunnel networks, and that it had withdrawn from most of Gaza. Two days later, the Israeli Army completed its withdrawal from all of Gaza.

As soon as Israel withdrew from Gaza, another 72-hour ceasefire took effect. This time, Hamas did not overtly violate the ceasefire. After the ceasefire ended, Hamas again launched rockets from Gaza into Israel, and the Israelis resumed shelling Gaza.

Thanks to Israel’s “Iron Dome” air defense system, most of the Hamas rockets did not reach targets in inhabited areas of Israel. Thanks to the Iron Dome system and Israel’s well-organized emergency medical facilities, the fatality rate during this summer’s fighting in Gaza have thus far amounted to less than one hundred Israeli deaths, but approximately 1,800 Palestinian deaths. Israel claims that between forty and fifty percent of the Palestinian deaths have been Hamas and affiliated combatants. Hamas claims that nearly all of the Palestinian deaths have been innocent civilians.

In Gaza, at least three UN facilities have been hit. The assumption has been that they were hit by Israel, but Israel points out that they never target UN aid locations or shelters, and Israel says it suspects that Hamas is responsible for at least some of the damage to UN locations. The TV coverage of grief stricken refugees weeping over dead children in UN shelters has been a public relations disaster for Israel, but what actually occurred and who is responsible for the tragedies has not yet been determined. If evidence indicates that Israel is not responsible for the attacks on UN locations, it will still be too late to prevent the public relations damage.

Interestingly, the Arab nations have not loudly condemned Israeli military action. This might be because many of Hamas’s usual allies in Kuwait and Qatar are experiencing second thoughts about instigating radical Islamic movements as they watch ISIS Islamic fundamentalists rape and pillage their way across neighboring Iraq. Most of the condemnation of Israel has come from the UN and from the West.

 

Apartment yard destroyed by Hamas rocket
Unaltered image by The Israel Project.

 

Since Hamas’s consolidation of power in Gaza in 2005, Western nations have almost completely stopped economic aid to Gaza. At the same time, Israel has tried to maintain an effective blockade of Gaza to prevent increased imports of rocket parts and other weapons from Iran. It is at times amusing to listen to various Iranian government spokesmen contradict each other as they brag about giving rockets, improved rocket technology, and other weapons to Hamas, while simultaneously denying sending Hamas rockets and weapons. I imagine that Iranian government foreign policy meetings must resemble a Three Stooges episode or a Marx Brothers movie.

In any event, while the rockets continue to fly into Israel from Gaza, the Israelis aren’t laughing. The exchange of fire between Hamas and their affiliates in Gaza and the Israeli Army continues. Early Sunday morning, August 10, Hamas rejected peace talks in Egypt. Then, around 8 A.M. Washington, D.C. time, Hamas announced that it is willing to participate in peace talks in Egypt. It could well be by the time this article is published that Hamas will have changed their minds three more times.

So what does this all mean for Israel and the Palestinian people in the near future? Sadly, my best guess is that although Hamas might be temporarily motivated to lower the level of fighting, they will still maintain their despotic rule in Gaza while they attempt to improve and replenish their rocket inventory with help from Iran. The Israelis will try to improve their very expensive Iron Dome system while simultaneously trying to improve their intelligence on terrorist activity by Hamas and their affiliate gangs in Gaza. The Israeli people will continue to live with the tension that has always been pervasive in Israel, and the civilians in Gaza will continue to suffer under the miserable administration that Hamas and Fatah have thus far delivered.

For the rest of the world, I would not recommend a vacation to either Gaza or Israel right now. Tragically, millions of children caught in the middle of the conflict don’t have that choice.

When Giants Dance — The Israeli/Palestinian Conflict

When the current Israeli/Palestinian conflict recently flared up, Holmes and I discussed the possibility of a fresh article on the topic. We concluded, however, that there was nothing fresh to say. To verify this, I looked up an article that Holmes wrote in November, 2012, which was the last time the ancient hostilities peaked. This is that same article, word for word. It was true then. It is true now. Generally speaking, it has been true for decades. We hope for the day when it is no longer true.

~ Piper Bayard

Israeli white phosphorous attack on UN school
unaltered image by HRW, wikimedia commons

When Giants Dance

By Jay Holmes

Today, news watchers in the West are seeing reports about the Israeli bombing of Gaza. Some are wondering if this week’s events in Israel and Gaza are the start World War Three.

My best guess is that this conflict will not escalate to that point, but if you happen to live in Gaza, it might feel like World War Three this week. If you happen to live in southern Israel, where the rockets fall every week, it might feel like that all the time.

Before throwing one more opinion into what will certainly not be the bloodiest war, but likely the most mediated war, let’s take a moment to consider the children on both sides of the border. These children have no control over the relations between Gaza and Israel, but the one constant tragedy in Gaza and southern Israel is that the children always suffer.

Of course, when I use the term “mediated” I am referring to the fact that the world’s “media” will deliver fantastic volumes of information about the current phase of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. It is sad how little of that information will be accurate or fairly presented. However, all of that information will likely generate revenue for the media industry.

To attempt to understand the current events in Gaza, we can help ourselves by considering a few of the less obvious facts.

We in the West think of Hamas as being in control of Gaza. Hamas likes to think that, as well, but it is not altogether accurate. Hamas appears to be one more run-of-the-mill Islamic terror group marching happily in step with all the other Islamic terror groups. But terrorists wreak havoc. This leaves them unskilled at performing anything like government. As a result, Hamas cannot control what goes on in Gaza.

Hamas is not even able to march happily in step with itself, which seriously impairs its ability to influence other Islamic terrorists in the area. The chaotic conditions in Gaza allowed competing terror groups to vacation there, and some of those vacationers decided to stay. Those groups do not obey Hamas. They obey whoever provides them with cash, weapons, hash, hookers, etc. Usually Syria and Iran would be that somebody, but Saudi Arabia and Gulf states are sometimes soft touches for cute young terror groups.

We in the West are not supposed to believe such dastardly things about our Saudi “friends.” However, the New American Reality Dictionary defines “friends” as, “Anyone who ships oil to the US.”

Many Americans find that disgusting. Many of those same Americans drive gasoline-consuming cars every day while they are finding that disgusting. Yes. Even my own car runs on gasoline, not on peaceful thoughts or good will.

Regardless of where the cash and weapons come from, we know where many of them end up—on Israeli roof tops. The current Israeli leader is Benjamin Netanyahu. The Israelis call him something else. I call him Beny Buddy. He calls me nothing at all. He never even calls me. I am not his friend. I’m not sure Beny does the friendship thing much. Living in that region might do that to a man.

In any event, his name hardly matters since this conflict predates him. Netanyahu and Likud, his political party, cannot remain in power if hundreds of rockets and mortar rounds from Gaza continue to land in Israel every month. From the Israeli perspective, the motives for the looming Israeli operations in Gaza are simple. The Israeli people don’t like rockets and bombs falling on their heads, and the current Israeli leadership does not like losing elections. Also, with Iran increasing the potency and quality of its missiles, the Israeli intelligence services might be feeling less patient than usual about the Gaza launch base.

The Hamas motives are a little trickier to define.

It takes a bit of guesswork, and that is because they are still guessing about it themselves. As long as Gaza remains in a state of chaos without any worthwhile government, and as long as start up terror groups are cutting their teeth in “Palestine,” anything can happen. And now it has.

While the Israelis love driving American tanks, they don’t always love American methods. Israel is not living on a giant Chinese credit card like the Pentagon is. If Israel calls up reservists, which it has, and it moves armor toward Gaza, it is NOT because Israelis think it is fun to waste fuel they cannot produce and can barely afford. Those tanks will end up in Gaza.

Hamas fully realizes this, and they are currently doing their best impersonation of innocent victims. They are not great actors, but they play for an easy audience—the Western media and Islamic-financed propaganda outlets. Hamas wants to generate “international outrage” as quickly as it can in order to give Israel as little time as possible to drive around Gaza blowing up rocket supplies with those cool tanks.

The Israeli lobbyists and propaganda outlets will seek the opposite. But Israelis are currently out of fad with a majority of Western voters, so they will be looking rather frustrated if you see them prowling the halls of the capitol or sitting in for some attack journalism by CNN interviewers.

I can just imagine a call from Iran to Hamas . . . “Okay. We’re sending more rockets. Rockets are supposed to blow up on those Jews, NOT in Gaza. Rockets don’t grow on trees, you know. If you can’t learn to take care of the rockets we give you, maybe we need to give them to someone else.”

One can find absurd humor in all of this as long as one does not live in or have relatives living in the region. Then the humor begins to pale. The children of Israel and Gaza have little to laugh at this week. They won’t have much next week, either.

ISIS — The Vultures Come Home to Roost

By Jay Holmes

This week, world governments and the attendant media gaggles are focused on the ISIS militia that has captured much of northern and western Iraq. From popular news reports, we might get the impression that ISIS’s expanding influence is a shocking and sudden surprise event. It isn’t.

 

Iraqi insurgents
image by US Dept. of Homeland Security, public domain

 

In spite of the usual “the CIA has failed us” blather from the major media drones, ISIS has, for the last decade, been well known by the US government and anyone else caring to pay attention to the PR department of the ISIS gang. When we read news reports that claim that the US government was, until this week, left in the dark concerning ISIS, we are reading analysis that is either from a fantastically uninformed source or from someone who simply invents fake news to suit their boss’s political agendas. ISIS has been well known under a variety of names to even the most feeble Western intelligence organizations since at least May of 2004, when the group web-published video of their execution of US contractor Nick Berg.

Even if the CIA wanted to hide the existence of ISIS, it could not have done so, as ISIS has never tried to be particularly secretive. On the contrary, they have always done their best to garner as much media attention as possible, and they have always been clear about their objectives.

So who is this group that seems to be surprising so many oblivious “reporters”?

In the broadest terms, there are three main intransigent political groups in Iraq—the Shia, the Sunnis, and the Kurds. The Shia Arab group is in power and is ruling with the same lack of skill that we would expect from any other Iraqi political coalition. The Shia block and their grossly incompetent and very corrupt Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki have made little effort to protect the interests of the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq or the large Sunni minority scattered around Iraq.

 

Nouri Al-Maliki
image by US government, public domain

 

In turn, radical members of the Sunni minority formed ISIS, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. In their early days, they called themselves Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Al-Qaeda has since decided that ISIS is “too barbaric and too radical” for Al-Qaeda standards. Translation—ISIS has so much funding from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar that we can’t control them.

The Kurds don’t back ISIS, nor do they care for Maliki and the Shias. The Kurds are Sunnis, but they are Kurds first. If they end up with their own country as a result of this conflict, they will be thrilled. Much of the online chatter of an independent Kurdish state originates with Kurdish sources. However, if the US fails to back up the Iraqi government sufficiently to save them from themselves, the Kurds could finally end up with their own country. (See Turkey–America’s Special Frenemy and  Turkey–Giving America the Bird.)

Why would certain Saudis, Kuwaitis, and Qataris back such a radical group so close to home?

Their main reason is that they pose as Sunni Islamists while living as hedonists, whereas the Iranian leadership poses as Shia Islamists while living as hedonists. Iran has, for decades, been exercising power throughout the area via their surrogate Hezbollah militia/terrorist group in Lebanon and their obedient servants, the Syrian mafia Assad family. The Shia-governed Iraqis are their pals.

The uprising in Syria was started by moderate Syrians in a desperate hope to find freedom. Iran quickly moved to help keep their obedient Assad servants in power. In response, Iran’s Shia Hezbollah militia went on a campaign to consolidate their power in Lebanon and Syria. Sunni radicals of various stripes banded together under the ISIS brand to oppose Hezbollah in Syria and Lebanon. As a result, most of the Syrian moderates were swept aside or murdered.

As more cash has flowed into ISIS pockets during the Syrian Civil War, the group’s influence has grown. In the meantime, Maliki’s government in Iraq has grown closer to Iran, while being propped up by US taxpayers.

Does your head hurt yet? It certainly should.

So why does the West care about one more war in the Land of Infinite Wars?

The collapse of the Iraqi Army is a frustrating embarrassment to the US government. Under the “you break it, you own it” doctrine first stated by US Army General Colin Powell,* both the Obama and Bush administrations have invested heavily in trying to finance and train something that might look vaguely like a functioning government in Iraq. In exchange for our $50,000,000,000 post-war reconstruction extravaganza, which has been managed by a 5,000-strong diplomatic corps, we ended up with something even more chaotic and violent than our worst inner-city ghettos. We ended up with Iraq. So did the poor Iraqis that live there. We Americans are a sentimental bunch, and many of us hate to think that all that reconstruction money we sent to Iraq was a complete waste.

 

General Colin Powell
image by Charles Haynes,
wikimedia commons

 

On the dark humor front, we are now being treated to the specter of the Iranian Mullahs offering to cooperate with the US—and anyone else that would like to show up—in bailing out Maliki’s government. Iran does not want ISIS to succeed in gaining control in Iraq. ISIS does not want Iran and the Shia Iraqis to succeed in Iraq, and the Kurds would like them both to go to hell as soon as possible.

What can or should America do?

For the present, the president is considering air strikes to back up the sham Iraqi Army. A US carrier has been ordered to approach Iraq. This will be the first time in history that the Shia radical thugs in charge in Iran will find themselves cheering the sight of a US Navy carrier.

The strategy over the last few months has been to send better weapons, including anti-armor missiles, humvees, and infantry support weapons, to the Iraqi Army. This strategy has backfired badly, as ISIS has captured large stockpiles of US weapons. I suppose that if each of our 5,000 diplomats in Iraq threw a rock at the advancing ISIS forces, that storm of rocks could slow them down. Perhaps ISIS would mistake the flying rocks as a sign from Allah and accept it as a command to stay out of the Shia dominated regions of Iraq. ISIS has had easy going in areas where they have a Sunni majority to back them up, but they will face discernable opposition in Shia areas.

What will the impacts be?

My best guesses are as follows. Neither Iran nor the US will quietly accept a radical Sunni regime in Iraq. If ISIS becomes too powerful, even their Saudi, Kuwaiti, and Qatari backers will grow uncomfortable with their presence and will withhold funding. ISIS will never be able to achieve their dream of consolidating power over all of Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. They may be able to keep a hold over Sunni dominated areas of Iraq, but they will face a constant struggle to occupy what they have thus far captured.

On the economic front, oil companies will do what they have been doing for a hundred years. They will raise the price of oil beyond any real escalated costs of obtaining crude.

On the political front at home, loyal Republicans will pretend that Iraq was once a great place to live, and they will blame the current disaster on Obama. Loyal Democrats will pretend that Iraq was once a great place to live, and they will blame the current disaster on George Bush. Loyal Americans will likely notice that both administrations demanded far too little of the Iraqi government that we financed and propped up, while thousands of our military members died or suffered serious wounds.

And for the children of Iraq? It’s another sunny day in the Land Between Two Rivers.

*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *

*I know that General Powell was the US Secretary of State in addition to being a general. But as events have often proven during the last half century, any third rate political bum can be a Secretary of State. It takes a bit more than that to be a US Army general, so I prefer to think of General Powell in terms of his higher status.

Boko Haram–The Nigerian Jihadi Biker Gang

By Jay Holmes

On April 14, 2014, a Boko Haram gang attacked a girls school in Chibok, Nigeria. After killing the armed guards at the school, the gang kidnapped 234 girls and possibly a dozen adult staff members. The attack captured the attention of the Western media, and the kidnapped girls have become something of a cause celeb in the West.

 

Image of kidnapped girls released by Boko Haram.
From Voice of America

 

This is not the first time that Boko Haram has kidnapped children.

For several years, they have been enslaving girls and pressing boys as young as twelve into jihadi service with little notice by the international media. This particular attack generated so much attention because the children’s families were not present at the school to be murdered or kidnapped–something Boko Haram has done in the past. This time, hundreds of distraught community members survived to speak up for the missing girls. Western military and intelligence authorities have had an eye on Boko Haram for about ten years. In the last five years, they have been particularly violent. This latest caper has now made them a household name in the West.

One predictable response to the kidnapping comes from NBC’s Andrea Mitchell. According to Mitchell, the male-dominated U.S. government has been slow to respond due to sexism. In an interview with U.S. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-California) on May 14, Mitchell stated, “It really calls into question whether the men in charge of our government, frankly, would have been responding more quickly, . . . despite Goodluck Jonathan, the president of Nigeria’s opposition, whether they would have been responding more rapidly if it had been schoolgirls, if it hadn’t been some other premise.” (This is an actual quote.)

I can rarely find a reason to praise Senator Feinstein, but on this occasion, she remained calm and was significantly more articulate than Mitchell. The Senator managed to state Mitchell’s botched question for her and answered it by responding with, “You mean if it had involved school boys? No.” To no avail, Mitchell feebly continued to press the point. U.S. Senators have more than enough work to do, and they shouldn’t have to conduct both sides of an interview.

So who are these latest media terrorist stars, and how might Western taxpayers  respond to them?

 

image by 2Bdea, public domain

 

Who the Boko Haram are depends on who you ask. One common trait throughout the group’s members is their tendency to travel on motorcycles through the forests and deserts of northern Nigeria, making them an African Jihadi Biker Gang. A decent motorcycle is a Boko Haram terrorist’s most prized possession.

Generally, most Western media vendors view the Boko Haram as an al-Qaeda affiliate in Nigeria. Actually, the al-Qaeda affiliation is, at most, minimal, and, in my view, there is no clear evidence of any actual material support for Boko Haram from al-Qaeda. Also, the particular version of vaguely Islamic religious dogma that Boko Haram claims to be espousing is not a version of Islam that al-Qaeda would tolerate. Unlike the al-Qaeda Sunni mainstream, Boko Haram terrorists are loosely Salafi Muslims. Their vaguely identifiable founder that rose to prominence in the 1980s, Mohammed Marwa, a.k.a. Maitatsine, even said that Mohammed was not actually a prophet. In fact, if the Boko Haram lived in mainstream al-Qaeda neighborhoods, they would have to quickly convert to al-Qaeda’s brand of Islam or face execution. Calling themselves Islamic and conducting criminal rampages is enough to meet the al-Qaeda international membership standard, but only while they remain out of reach of true al-Qaeda.

 

Boko Haram Terrorist
image by Grin160, wikimedia commons

 

 

Not all Western military and intelligence officials share my view. Some folks at the Pentagon and elsewhere feel that Boko Haram is a full-fledged al-Qaeda brand terrorist franchise. I disagree. In any case, though, Boko Haram style mayhem was popular in Nigeria long before al-Qaeda was born. Rebranding that mayhem has little impact on Boko Haram or on their victims.

 

Pre-Boko Haram Nigerian Terrorist (note similarity)
image by Grin160, wikimedia commons

 

Boko Haram is not a single organization. There are at least three major groupings of them spread across northern Nigeria. Their current maggot-in-chief, Abubakar Shekau, has direct control of perhaps half of the Boko Haram members. Many of the rest are spread out in remote areas and don’t seem to be under any command/control apparatus to a centralized leadership. It’s entirely possible that some of them have never even heard of al-Qaeda.

In spite of their lack of strong organizational skills, the Boko Haram are a significant problem for Nigerians. According to African news sources, they have murdered between ten and fifteen thousand civilians in the last five years and have kidnapped thousands more. They claim they are Islamic and want to institute Sharia law, but they constantly violate basic Sharia precepts themselves with their outright theft from and murder of Islamics, along with non-Islamics.

The Boko Haram’s basic reason for existing is stated as an anti-Western/anti-corruption agenda. Their name translates roughly to “Westernization is forbidden.” The rampant corruption and gross incompetence of the government of Nigeria has provided them with fertile ground in which to grow. However, the recent kidnapping of the 234 girls from the school in Chibok will likely further tarnish their image and further delegitimize them as a religious or anti-corruption group.

 

Boko Haram Maggot-In-Chief Abukakar Shekau
Note funny hat pilfered from Ghadafi’s closet.
Image from Voice of America

 

The Nigerian government has not shown itself capable of exercising legitimate authority over the northern half of Nigeria. They haven’t done a great job in southern Nigeria either. In 2010-2013, operations conducted by the Nigerian Army in northern Nigeria succeeded in driving Boko Haram out of their comfortable urban strongholds, but thousands of them remain at large in rural northern areas.

So precisely how “should” the West respond?

Western responses to the kidnapping so far have been understandably minimal. Given the prevalence of mayhem across Africa and the Middle East, and with a rampantly corrupt government in charge of Nigeria, what exactly can the U.S. and other Western nations commit in rescuing the girls?

Earlier this month during a visit to Ethiopia, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said, “The kidnapping of hundreds of children by Boko Haram is an unconscionable crime, and we will do everything possible to support the Nigerian government to return these young women to their homes and to hold the perpetrators to justice.” (The emphasis is mine.) Wow. Everything possible? When does the 1^st Marine Division arrive in Nigeria, and when do the bombings start? Will we use nukes? Probably not. Those few members of Boko Haram that may have heard about Kerry’s threat are likely not too convinced.

 

Unconvinced Boko Haram Terrorists
Image from The Sun
Can Our Military Defeat Boko Haram?
by Adedoyin Adewumi

 

Thus far, the Organization of African States has condemned the kidnappings. It is possible that they will eventually muster a military force to enter northern Nigeria to assist the Nigerian military in a campaign against the Boko Haram. Thus far, though the move was initially opposed by the Nigerian government, the U.K. has sent a small contingent of Special Forces to Nigeria. Both the U.S. and the U.K. are providing the Nigerian government with intelligence and reconnaissance information. The official position about whether or not there are U.S. Special Forces in Nigeria is not yet clear. The U.S. government thus far states that it is considering sending U.S. Special Forces to Nigeria.

What is completely clear is that any assistance given to the Nigerian government should not take the form of financial aid or military hardware. Nigeria has the natural resources required for the elimination of poverty and unemployment. What it lacks is an effective government. If the U.S. government decides to conduct anti-Boko Haram operations in Nigeria, it should do so directly. The state of the Nigerian national government clearly indicates that any aid in money or goods will be wasted and may possibly end up in the hands of Boko Haram or other similar gangsters. I have suggested to the Pentagon that NBC Chief Foreign Analyst Andrea Mitchell be parachuted into northern Nigeria to straighten things out. The Pentagon has yet to respond to my suggestion.

Without fundamental changes in the culture and government of Nigeria, outsiders have little chance of eradicating mayhem in that country. The U.S. taxpayers would have little stomach for any large-scale involvement there. However, it is possible that, with small-scale covert action backed up by drone operators and good reconnaissance, the kidnapped girls could be rescued. Any covert operation conducted by outsiders in Nigeria will only remain “covert” to the Boko Haram until the first shot is fired or the first drone attack is launched. Hope remains for the kidnapped girls, but for the broader problems in Nigeria, hope is in short supply.

Tunisia–Bellweather of Democracy and Equality in the Muslim World

By Jay Holmes

On January 26, 2014 a Constituent Assembly in Tunisia approved a new national constitution. Any nation that undergoes a revolution and gets a representative assembly to agree on a new constitution can expect congratulations from Western governments. In the case of Tunisia, the usual diplomatic congratulations were accompanied by effusive praise. French President François Hollande went as far as announcing that Tunisia’s new constitution could serve as a model for other recent revolutions. So precisely why are Western governments responding to Tunisia’s new constitution with glee, and what are the probable impacts?

Tunisian Constituent Assembly signs new constitution
image by Ennahda, wikimedia commons

A glance at Tunisia’s recent past might help lend some perspective. In 1987, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali managed a bloodless coup and took control of Tunisia. Two years later, Tunisia held presidential elections. Ben Ali used government assets to drown out opposition prior to the elections, and many foreign observers believed the elections were at least partially rigged. To no one’s surprise, Ben Ali won.

He managed to win re-election two more times in single-party affairs. According to the 1959 Constitution of Tunisia, Ben Ali should not have been able to run for a fourth term. However, in 2002 after his third election, Ben Ali amended the Tunisian Constitution to allow himself to run a fourth time in 2004. Miraculously, and with government squelching of opposition parties and tight control of vote counters, he received 94% of the vote.

In 2006, we saw a hint of change. The main opposition party—the Progressive Democratic Party—elected May Eljeribi as their party leader. Even in Western nations, it is still newsworthy when a female holds a high political position. As recently as 1979, Lady Margaret Thatcher’s selection as Prime Minister was considered a revolutionary event by the Western political establishment. In 2006, for a largely Islamic nation like Tunisia to have a woman running the principal opposition party was highly significant news. Ben Ali’s spokesmen had constantly portrayed his opposition as Maoist radicals and Islamic terrorists. Eljeribi’s election belied this and clearly indicated there was a strong current of political democratic secularism in Tunisian society.

By 2007, Al Qaeda and many loosely associated affiliate terrorist groups were trying to co-opt the growing discontent in Tunisia. Ben-Ali had been unpopular through most of his tenure due to his incompetence as a leader and his ruthlessness toward any opposition. From Al-Qaeda’s point of view, the time was ripe for replacing the ruthless independent dictator with a radical Islamic dictator. Ben Ali’s police state was able to ward off an Al-Qaeda model revolution, but his other opposition continued to grow more vocal.

Tunisian protests for sexual equality
March 4, 2009
image by Magharebia, wikimedia commons

What journalists refer to as the “Arab Spring” started in Tunisia in 2010. Public protests grew and gained attention from Western media outlets.

Then, in January 2011, aided by cell phones and the Internet, the protestors gained so much popularity and momentum that the despised Ben-Ali family was forced to escape into exile. Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi announced an interim national unity government.

However, the protestors were not completely satisfied. In February of 2011, Ghannouchi resigned.  The following month, the interim government announced that elections would be held in July for a democratic constitutional convention.

That’s when the work really began for the Tunisian people. Throwing the Ben Ali gang out of Tunisia was difficult enough. Forming a constitution and government that would satisfy the will of the Tunisian people rather than the will of a well-armed Islamic radical minority was a daunting task.

In the midst of this turmoil, things became even more difficult when the bloody Libyan revolution next door spilled over into eastern Tunisia. Islamic extremists were doing all they could to bully their way to power in Tunisia.

The Ennahda Islamist Political party, with economic assistance from foreign sources and the support of al-Qaeda and various al-Qaeda clones, cast a wide net over Islamic supporters and became the largest single political party in Tunisia, winning the parliamentary elections in October of 2011. However, because their wide net caught up so many moderates, the radical Islamists within Ennahda could not gain a clear consensus among their own ranks to move their own members toward implementation of Sharia law. Naturally, the radicals resorted to violence. Assassination and intimidation campaigns grew in the fertile chaos of Tunisia.

When the Ennahda-led government tried to introduce a reduction in civil rights for women in 2012, protests swelled again across Tunisia. Ennahda backed away from the proposed “reforms.”

By late 2013, it appeared that Tunisians would have difficulty asserting their own political will to produce a constitution.  Western observers were not optimistic about the future of freedom and democracy there. Fortunately, the Tunisians were more optimistic and did not yield to radical Islamic terrorism and political coercion.

Tunisian Constituent Assembly
image by Ennahda, wikimedia commons

On January 26, 2014, after two years of long and heated debates, two assassinations of major opposition members, and intense campaigns of coercion, a 146-article draft constitution won approval with a 200-12 vote by the Constituent Assembly. Interim President Moncef Marzouki announced “With the birth of this text, we confirm our victory over dictatorship”, and signed it into law the following day.

The new constitution in Tunisia matters for several reasons. It was a victory of democracy over despotism. If we look at the provisions in the constitution, we see the hand print of the Islamist minority, but it is not the constitution that they wanted. While the document mentions an “Arabic” and “Islamic” identity of the Tunisian people, it does not incorporate Sharia law as its standard. Islamic radicals, while not removed from the political landscape in Tunisia, did not force their will over the non-radical majority of the Tunisian people.

The new constitution contains strong safeguards for democratic representation, and that, in itself, is a major victory for democracy. It also clearly states that women have equal rights.

Many observers are claiming that this is the “first time” that an Islamic nation has granted equal rights to women. Not so. Tunisia’s first constitution in 1959 also included women’s equality. So in reality, the constitutional provision represents a return to longstanding cultural traditions in that country. It is a valuable clue that Tunisians had an identity long before the Ottoman Empire colonized them. They are an “Islamic” population, and, for lack of a more accurate ethnic term, they are an “Arab” country, but they have a society that is based on a culture that is all their own.

For now, it appears that Tunisia will hold national elections within a year. The jihadi types will not give up easily. They will continue their campaign of terror against freedom in Tunisia, but they will do so with decreasing prospects and no popular support. Reason has outweighed radicalism among Tunisians.

First Reading of the Emancipation Proclamation
by Abraham Lincoln
Painting by Francis Bicknell Carpenter

Tunisia’s prosperity, security, and social equality will not happen overnight, but Tunisia now has a constitution that will allow positive growth to occur. For comparison sake, we might consider U.S. Republican President Abraham Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation of 1863.  It wasn’t until two years later that the U.S. Constitution was amended to abolish slavery. And while slaves in the U.S. were freed in fact in 1865, it was not until 1963 that black Americans were allowed to attend University of Alabama, and that required the assistance of the U.S. Army’s 101^st Airborne Division. In the age of cell phones and internet communications, perhaps positive changes can occur more rapidly in Tunisia, and will hopefully not require any effort on the part of the U.S. Army.

From a Western point of view, the Tunisian constitution matters because it is a clear indication that democracy can happen in an Arab Islamic nation, even when terrorists are doing their best to prevent it. It is proof to the Tunisians and to anyone else in the world that their voices can matter, and that none of us should give up when the loud screams of radicals seem to drown out more reasonable voices.

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Bayard & Holmes

Tunisia–Bellweather of Democracy in the Islamic World

What Do You Remember?

image from US Navy

I woke up to hear a voice on the radio saying that two planes had crashed into the twin towers. I knew instantly it was no accident, but I had no way to compute the information with my pre-9/11 mindset. Then I turned on the TV, and I knew our world was changed forever. And I held my children close and wept.

One of the many things I remember was how all of the hospitals were preparing to take in survivors, but so few came. People either died, or they walked away.

What do you remember?

Never forget.

Piper Bayard

Egyptian Majority Evicts the Muslim Brotherhood

By Jay Holmes

In Cairo on the morning of August 18, the Egyptian military and police evicted protestors from the al Fath Mosque. In the chaos that has overtaken Egypt, this eviction could be dismissed as an insignificant event, but it can also be seen as an important moment in the decision-making of the current military-backed Egyptian government.

Egyptians Celebrate Morsi’s Ouster
image from Voice of America, July 7, 2013

Supporters of the recently-ousted Egyptian President Morsi, who was backed by the Muslim Brotherhood, called for protests last week. Thousands poured out and set up “occupy style” encampments in Cairo. When the Egyptian military and police broke up the encampments, Muslim Brotherhood supporters packed into the al Fath Mosque, which they had been using as a hospital. On August 18, both the Morsi supporters and the police fired shots. Both claim that the other side fired on them first.

On the face of it, the fact that thousands of Egyptians supported the Muslim Brotherhood was a victory for them, but millions of Egyptians turned out to oppose them. The Muslim Brotherhood’s loud past claims of majority rule are now falling on deaf ears in Egypt. The majority of Egyptians have unequivocally denounced both the Brotherhood and Morsi’s attempt to set up a personal kingdom for himself. Morsi had clearly intended to live well in the dictatorship that he was building, but for the average Egyptian, it was rapidly becoming a case of “let them eat Sharia Law.” The majority of people in Egypt don’t want Sharia Law as a substitute for a functioning government.

Depending on who you ask in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has the support of somewhere between fifteen to twenty percent of Egyptian men. In the confusion of the early post-Mubarak days, they were able to use their well-established organization to win an election with promises of religious freedom, democratic rule, and women’s rights under the label of the “Freedom and Justice Party.” Once in power, Morsi immediately betrayed his campaign promises and began to organize a powerful junta for himself and Muslim Brotherhood leaders under the guise of a Sharia Law theocracy.

On July 3, 2013, the Egyptian military calculated that it had enough popular backing to overthrow Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. The successful eviction of the Morsi supporters from the al Fath Mosque indicates that its calculation was correct. In essence, the people of Egypt decided that they were not going to tolerate the political con job that Islamic radicals pulled off, and they did something about it. The Egyptian military realized that Morsi had lost any semblance of majority backing and acted to save Egypt from falling back into the Dark Ages.

Reactions in the West are less clear.

Most of the Western media and many in Western governments have feigned shock at the Egyptian military’s “coup-that-wasn’t-a-coup.” Some in the media and government are apparently so clueless or so immersed in irrational dogma that their dismay at the “coup” is genuine.

In the US, the White House and congressmen from both major parties have engaged in poorly-staged hand wringing exercises to show their “deep concern” that the “coup-that-wasn’t-a-coup-and-therefore-can-still-be-funded-by-us” has used violence against the Muslim Brotherhood. The “deep concern” has not been deep enough to stop funding the Egyptian military.

We still want and need Egypt to allow our military aircraft to overfly that country on short notice. We still want to be able to use Egyptian air bases for staging operations in the region. And we still want our Navy to cut to the head of the traffic line at the congested Suez Canal. Obama and other politicians can express all the “deep concern” that they want over events in Egypt, but their words come at a price. Egyptians and others in the region now have their own deep concern that the US and Europe are unwilling to help them overthrow Islamic radicals.

Fortunately Saudi Arabia and the oil-rich Gulf States see themselves at odds with the Muslim Brotherhood and are enthusiastically financing the Egyptian government. The couple of billion a year that we give to Egypt no longer constitutes economic survival for that country. US money helps, but it doesn’t carry the same leverage that it once did.

Israel realizes that the Egyptian military is capable of keeping to a peace treaty with them, and that the Muslim Brotherhood was maneuvering Egypt toward war with Israel. Israel is hoping for the current Egyptian government to succeed.

Iran and its minions in Hamas are cheering for the Muslim Brotherhood to regain control in Egypt. While the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has no intention of accepting Iranian theocratic leadership, from the Iranian point of view, an Egypt led by the Muslim Brotherhood can at least be counted on to attack Israel and support the most radical elements amongst the Palestinians.

The normal variety of international adventure-tourist terrorists are doing their best to use Iranian funds and weapons to generate as much violence as possible in Egypt. My guess is that although they will cause misery, they will not be able to reinstall the Muslim Brotherhood or Sharia Law in that country.

What the future government in Egypt will look like is not altogether clear. Fortunately for Egyptians and everyone else in the region, it likely won’t include Sharia Law. They may end up with an “all new, more powerful deep cleaning” Mubarak-style junta, but for the sake of the Egyptian people, I hope that they end up with a government that reduces corruption and improves the rights and the quality of life in Egypt.