ANTHROPOID — Espionage Legend on the Big Screen

Bayard & Holmes

~ Piper Bayard & Jay Holmes

ANTHROPOID brings one of history’s legendary espionage events to the big screen – the WWII assassination of SS-Obergruppenführer Reinhard Heydrich by two Czech paratroopers and a few Czech resistance fighters.

 

2016 Aug Anthropoid Movie Poster

 

Heydrich, also known as the Butcher of Prague, was the architect of Hitler’s death camps and third in command after Hitler and Himmler. Jan Kubis (played by Jamie Dornan) and Jozef Gabcik (played by Cillian Murphy) trained for months in the UK and then parachuted into Nazi-occupied Czechoslovakia. Once in Prague, they met up with the dwindling group of Czech resistance fighters, who helped them plan and execute Operation Anthropoid. Heydrich was the highest ranking Nazi officer assassinated during WWII.

Piper Bayard:

This movie is a symphony compared to a Bourne movie rock concert.

If you’re looking for unrealistic characters who do unrealistic things to thwart unrealistic villains with unrealistic explosions and quippy dialogue, this is not the movie for you.  On the other hand, if you enjoy historically accurate war dramas about real events and real people, then you will likely find ANTHROPOID captivating and informative.

ANTHROPOID thankfully makes no effort to glamorize espionage, war, or the ordinary people made extraordinary by the demands of integrity and circumstance.

Courage falters, equipment fails, and humans make stupid mistakes, while at the same time they rise over and over again with a stubborn courage and devotion to their mission and to the Czechoslovakian people. While historical sources differ on the details, the main events surrounding the assassination are well portrayed.

 

Jamie Dornan as Jan Kubis and Cillian Murphy as Jozef Gabcik

Jamie Dornan as Jan Kubis and
Cillian Murphy as Jozef Gabcik

 

The tension and conflict are well drawn in spite of a script that is at times a bit stiff.

The stakes are clear. There is no doubt that not only are the lives of the Czech resistance fighters on the line, but also the lives of their families and the people of Czechoslovakia. The drama is not manufactured, but rather real, and raw, and tremendous in the fact that in spite of all human fears and failings, Jan Kubis and Jozef Gabcik carried on and succeeded in one of the greatest assassinations in history.

Jay Holmes:

In the way of disclosure, I must explain that I could not view Anthropoid with the objectivity that a reviewer should always employ.

Though I was not alive at the time of the operation, and I am not of Czech descent, I admire the operatives that conducted the operation, and I have always considered the Nazis to be contemptible. That combination makes it difficult for me to be completely objective in reviewing a movie like ANTHROPOID, but I am happy to share my impressions.

 

The real Jan Kubis and Jozef Gabcik Image by UK Govt., public domain

The real Jan Kubis and Jozef Gabcik
Image by UK Govt., public domain

 

Most war movies and action films that depict historic events are created with an emphasis on watchability, and the pace of events, the characters, and the dialogue sacrifice accuracy to make them more fun to watch. ANTHROPOID is not fun to watch, but it is an excellent movie all the same.

I am fairly well read on Operation Anthropoid, and I was once fortunate enough to meet a retired member of British Intelligence that had helped prepare the mission.

It is my impression that the movie ANTHROPOID succeeded in closely portraying the actions and moods of the men and women that were involved in the operation. For me, this made the movie more acceptable. It seems to me that the writer, producer, and actors were perhaps somewhat reverent in their attention to detail and accuracy. The movie may be the best memorial to Operation Anthropoid yet created. As such, I applaud it.

 

Reinhard Heydrich's car after the attack. Image in German Federal Archive, public domain

Reinhard Heydrich’s car after the attack.
Image in German Federal Archive, public domain

 

Interestingly, the process of researching and producing the movie has reawakened the Czech public’s interest in the event.

The Czech Government has now agreed to do forensic work to try to identify bodies from unmarked graves of that period and location to try to locate and rebury the Czech resistance fighters involved in Operation Anthropoid, and give them a proper military burial. I commend the Czech people for pursuing this course. The makers of Anthropoid can be proud that their movie has a tangible result beyond, and more important than, the box office.

Our Rating:

Overall the early reviews of the movie have been tepid. We will depart from the trend and give Anthropoid the Bayard and Holmes .44 magnum – our highest rating.

If the events of WWII and the moral questions surrounding those events matter to you, or if you are interested in raw espionage legend and the feats of real operatives, then you should make the short pilgrimage to see ANTHROPOID. Enjoy the symphony.

 

 

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Ben MacIntyre’s DOUBLE CROSS: The True Story of the D-Day Spies

Bayard & Holmes

~  Jay Holmes

DOUBLE CROSS, by writer-at-large and associate editor of the Times of London Ben MacIntyre, addresses one of the more complex and important intelligence operations of World War Two. It explains how the UK’s MI-5 Counter Intelligence division quite effectively turned and managed German spies in an attempt to deceive Germany about the Allied plans for the invasion of Western Europe in 1944.

 

Double Cross The True Story of the D-Day Spies Ben MacIntyre Paperback Cover

 

In DOUBLE CROSS, McIntyre manages to present personalities from both sides of that terrible war in very human form.

He demonstrates how imperfect people from diverse backgrounds working for MI-5 shared that one essential quality that any effective intelligence person must have. They shared a genuine commitment to their mission. In this case, their mission was to help defeat Nazi Germany. By most traditional standards, the agents would not appear to be “cut from the right cloth.” In some instances their handlers committed blunders in dealing with them. The book clearly shows the reasons why each of them might have failed miserably, as well as why they didn’t.

The first thing about this book that jumps out is its readability.

Great Britain’s operation for running double agents involved many people and many details. The details can be tedious to consider, but without considering enough of them, these operations can’t be reasonably understood. MacIntyre has done a brilliant job of presenting enough details without making the book read like a boring bureaucratic report. I envy his ability to present such a complex and important piece of history in such a readable form.

Good history writers do good research—lots of it—and Ben MacIntyre certainly did his. But he did something else as well. He very skillfully analyzed the collected data and produced an accurate and clear interpretation of the facts. I’ve never met Ben MacIntyre, but if he was never a spook, he should have been one. For us.

I had previously read and enjoyed a couple of MacIntyre’s books, but so far, this must be his masterpiece.

I have no hesitation in giving this book a Five Star rating on the Five Star scale. It’s not a movie but I can’t help but assign our Bayard and Holmes “.44-Magnum” rating because I so rarely get to use that top assessment. Anyone with interest in World War Two or the world of intelligence operations, or who simply likes good action stories, should absolutely read this book. It’s purely a great book.

Bravo to Ben MacIntyre for staying awake and on course through so many hours of work reading thousands of pages of documents to get to the critical facts. Well done!

You can find DOUBLE CROSS, along with MacIntyre’s other books, at Ben MacIntyre: Books, Biography, Blog, Audiobooks, Kindle.

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Bayard & Holmes Official Photo

Piper Bayard is an author and a recovering attorney. Her writing partner, Jay Holmes, is an anonymous senior member of the intelligence community and a field veteran from the Cold War through the current Global War on Terror.

Together, they are the bestselling authors of the international spy thriller, THE SPY BRIDE, now available on kindle and in paperback at Amazon and on nook and paperback at Barnes & Noble.

THE SPY BRIDE Final Cover 3 inch

 

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You can contact Bayard & Holmes in comments below, at their site, Bayard & Holmes, on Twitter at @piperbayard, on Facebook at Bayard & Holmes, or at their email, BH@BayardandHolmes.com.

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Germans Thrown Under the Migrant Politics Bus

Bayard & Holmes

~ Piper Bayard and Jay Holmes

When the crucible of reality proves political ideals to be harmful to the people, political leaders have two choices: they can own up to the issues, or they can suppress evidence in a bid to maintain their power. When leaders choose the latter, the dysfunction inevitably seeps through the cracks of the propaganda containment efforts, and when it does, the political leaders need someone to throw under the bus. In Germany, that “someone” is the German people.

 

Syrian refugees bound for Germany and Central Europe Image by Mstyslav Chernov, wikimedia commons.

Syrian refugees bound for Germany and Central Europe
Image by Mstyslav Chernov, wikimedia commons.

 

German Chancellor Merkel’s willkommenskultur open door policy resulted in 1.1 million North African and Arab refugees flooding into Germany in 2015 – over five times the number anticipated.

Overall, 72% of the migrants are men, 13% are women, and 15% are children. Germany admits it has already lost track of half of these refugees, and that many of them are not Syrian at all. This flood of humanity is not receding with the turn of the calendar year, and the Gatestone Institute predicts that, with family reunifications, the number of migrants in Germany could swell to as many as 7 million.

When we consider the fact that European countries haven’t even integrated with each other over the past thousand years, it’s no surprise that Germany and the rest of Europe are now in the grip of a culture clash. One of the nastiest elements of that culture clash is the spike in crime in the German refugee camps and surrounding areas, particularly in sexual assault rates.

While German officials and media have made frantic efforts to hide this crack in the practical applicability of their ideals, the dark truth came to a head on New Year’s Eve.

Organized groups of predatory “North African and Arab” men surrounded German women and men in New Year’s Eve crowds and sexually assaulted them in a practice known as “taḥarrush gamāʿī,” or taharrush gamea. This “sex game” is an Arab phenomenon first given a name in Egypt in 2004, and it is similar to what is known in the West as a gang rape.

While police recorded refugee-perpetrated sexual assaults and robberies throughout German cities on New Year’s Eve, 1,049 of those reports came from the city of Cologne. (For full police list see Revealed: Full List of 1,049 Victims, Crimes Committed During Cologne New Year’s Sex Assaults.) Over 359 women reported being sexually assaulted in every way from groping, to hands up their skirts and down their pants, to fingers shoved inside them, to all out rape.

The following has been the official response of the German government to the sexual attacks:

  • News of the attacks was suppressed for days until nearly 100 women had come forward and social media had circulated the story.

 

 

  • The Mayor of Cologne, Henriette Reker, advised that women should be more careful. The town would distribute guidelines to prepare women against sexual attacks. One “guideline” recommended by Reker was that women should keep strangers “at arm’s length.”
  • Mayor Reker refuted her own chief of police by insisting the mass, organized attacks had nothing to do with the migrants, although the police chief reported that 14 out of 15 of the attackers were of “North African and Arab” origin.
  • In spite of enormous security camera surveillance, only 30 suspects have been identified, and only two are behind bars. All are North Africans.
  • Flyers have been posted at public facilities with cartoon drawings attempting to educate refugees that they should not assault women.
  • Interior Minister Ralf Jaeger stated, “What happens on the right-wing platforms and in chat rooms is at least as awful as the acts of those assaulting the women.” (Apparently, he is unfamiliar with the difference between disliking people and raping them.)

And from other quarters . . .

  • The German feminist response has been to say that German born men attack women, too. Blame German born men.
  • One Cologne New Year’s Eve sexual assault victim gave an interview to the news describing her attackers as dark-skinned Arabic speakers. A social media troll then took a clip from the interview and posted it on the Internet, suggesting her account was nothing but anti-Muslim propaganda. The video included her full name and her work place, and it went viral. The woman received threatening phone calls at work and was attacked on Facebook as being “racist” and a “right-winger.”
  • Imam Sami Abu-Musuf of the Al Tawheed mosque in Cologne declared the sex assaults were the women’s own fault for wearing Western clothing and perfume.

The New Year’s Eve attacks are not the first indication that Merkel’s open door policy is creating unforeseen trauma for the German public.

  • Sexual assaults are an “everyday event” at registration centers, including assaults on the staff, and women are sold for 10 Euros a trick inside the camps.
  • Having brought tribal, cultural, and theological divisions with them, warring gangs within camps frequently clash, and Christians and homosexuals suffer brutal attacks. One brawl at a Hamburg registration center involved 200 Syrians and Afghanis. Fifty police vehicles were called in to quell the violence.
  • In response to this violence inside refugee camps, Hamburg, Germany passed a law in October 2015, allowing the government to seize vacant commercial properties for migrant housing.
  • Small towns have awakened to 25% – 50% increases in their populations, with tent cities thrown up at their edges inside of a week. Those towns report increased crime and severely decreased business traffic, as well as residents afraid to leave their homes. Parents have been cautioned to not allow their children outside alone.
  • School gym classes and sports clubs in cities have been canceled as the gymnasiums have been filled with refugees.
  • Women across Europe have been advised to put away their midriff tops and short skirts to avoid “misunderstandings” with the migrants.
  • Groups of migrant women have attacked European women on the beaches for wearing skimpy clothing.
  • Immigrant men have arrived with brides as young as 12 – 14 years old. Some of these child brides already have children of their own. These marriages are not recognized in Germany, and the girls are are being treated as “unaccompanied minors,” to be cared for by the Youth Welfare Office.
  • The gun-control loving societies of Europe are now arming themselves in every way they can. Purchase of air-propelled firearms skyrocketed in Germany after the New Year’s Eve attacks, and rates for gun permits and pepper spray sales are unprecedented. The black market for firearms is booming Germany and the rest of the EU states that are dealing with the migrant crisis.

Rather than face the fact that the overnight influx of 1.1 million North Africans and Arabs has created severe social problems for Germany, German officials are continuing their narrative that the refugees are no different from Germans, and that suggesting they are is both “racist” and “counter to European values.” By insisting that it is inappropriate to imply that diverse African and Middle Eastern cultures might actually be diverse, having different values, mores, and norms from Europeans that would potentially make them incompatible, German officials are missing a few points.

  • Refugees are fleeing from desperate situations. They did not wake up one morning and say, “Hey. I think I want to be German. I want to give up my child brides and accept women and homosexuals as my equals.” Just because they leave North Africa and Syria, it doesn’t mean they want to put on lederhosen and embrace women’s rights, sexual freedom and equality, and German laws.
  • These refugees largely hail from countries where women and children have little or no rights and are, for all intents and purposes, themselves the property of their male relatives. Unless Germany meets this core difference head on and emphasizes to the migrants from their arrival that women are not the property of men, the male refugees will be unlikely to recognize or accept this fact, and the female refugees will be conceptually unable to exercise their freedom. This re-education is essential for integration into Western societies.
  • By hiding and excusing the crimes perpetrated by the migrants, the German government sends the message to the German people that it will not protect them. This shreds the social contract, and vigilantism and radical anti-government organizations prosper.
  • By hiding and excusing the behavior of these migrants, the German government perpetuates racism. It sends the message to both the German people and the migrants that the newcomers are not capable of behaving properly in German society – that they are not the equal of Germans and need special rules.
  • The German government is placing the burden of physical safety onto the public when it insists that women should change their dress and behavior and that parents should restrict their children’s movements to avoid being molested or raped by the large male migrant population. This is a suppression of the civil rights of all German citizens and sets back women’s rights, in particular, a good four hundred years.

Germany is not alone in excusing and covering evidence of crimes committed by North African and Arab migrants.*

Taharrush gamea attacks were first reported in Sweden at the 2014 We Are Sthlm music festival. At that time, Stockholm police were instructed not to reveal the ethnicity or nationality of the attackers for fear of being seen as “racists.” It’s worth noting that Sweden has now changed its open door policy for refugees as of November of 2015, reverting to EU minimum requirements.

Government suppression of evidence of the clash between European and migrant cultural practices and norms not only fails to address the needs of the migrants, but risks creating a severe backlash from citizens of the host countries.

The only hope the West has of successfully assimilating this massive flow of North African and Arab refugees is to demand that the migrants accede to their host countries’ customs and laws without exception. Migrants that break the laws of the host countries must be dealt with swiftly and unapologetically with the protection of citizens being the utmost priority. Social contract demands this from those who govern, but that is only possible when those who govern are willing to be flexible and resourceful enough in modifying their ideals to meet the demands of reality.

Unless Germany develops an open door policy for reality, either the people will turn on the migrants, turn on those whom they elected to provide common security, or both.

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This video statement by Paul Joseph Watson sums up the situation well:

The Rape of Europe

 

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*The practice of taharrush gamea reached Finland in 2015 after that country took in a record 32,000 refugees, giving Finland the fourth highest number of refugees per capita in the EU.

According to the deputy chief of police in Helsinki, Ilkka Koskimaki, sexual assault was unknown in Finland prior to the influx of immigrants, making the 14 sexual assaults in 2015 a record year. In response, unarmed groups calling themselves the “Sons of Odin” now patrol the streets in many towns where refugees are housed.

This past New Year’s Eve, staff at the asylum reception centers tipped off police about planned taharrush gamea attacks. In spite of the “massive” police presence sent to control approximately 1000 Iraqi refugees who had gathered in the tunnels around the central railway, security personnel reported unprecedented widespread sexual harassment. Thus far, Finland, unlike many European governments, does not appear to be attempting to cover up the ethnicities or nationalities of the perpetrators.

A Few of Our Sources:

1.  “Germany Registers Record 1.1 Million Asylum Seekers in 2015”  http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2016/1/6/refugees-germany-more-than-1million.html

2.  “Germany: Migrant Crime Wave, Police Capitulate”  http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6668/germany-migrant-crime-wave

3.  “Taharrush gamea” https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taharrush_gamea

4.  “Revealed: Full List of 1,049 Victims, Crimes Committed During Cologne New Year’s Sex Assaults” http://www.breitbart.com/london/2016/01/21/revealed-full-list-of-1049-victims-crimes-committed-during-cologne-new-years-eve-sex-assaults/

5.  “Cologne Mayor: Women Should Be More Careful After Migrant Mass Rapes, Promises ‘Guidance” So They Can “Prepare'” http://www.breitbart.com/london/2016/01/05/cologne-mayor-women-careful-migrant-mass-rapes-promises-guidance-can-prepare/

6.  “Germans Battle Refugee Sex Assaults with Signs, Cartoons”  http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/01/22/germans-battle-refugee-sex-assaults-with-signs-cartoons.html

7.  “Cologne Assault: Cultural Difference Is No Excuse for Rape”  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/12087780/Cologne-assault-Cultural-difference-is-no-excuse-for-rape.html

8.  “Cologne Sexual Assault Victim Called a Rapist and Harassed After Identifying Her Attackers” http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2016/01/13/2770829/

9.  “Muslim Cleric Says Cologne Sex Attacks Were the Victims’ Fault Because They Wore Perfume” http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3408033/Muslim-cleric-says-Cologne-sex-attacks-victims-fault-wore-PERFUME.html

10.  “Migrant Crisis: Women Sold for Sex for €10 in German Refugee Camps”  http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/migrant-crisis-women-sold-sex-10-german-refugee-camps-1524515

11.  “Inside the ‘Refugee Centers:’ A Worker Speaks” http://newobserveronline.com/inside-the-refugee-centers-a-worker-speaks/

12.  “Horror as Christian Migrant ‘Brutally Beaten with Baton in Refugee Camp'”  http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/613479/Migrant-Refugee-Germany-Camp-Attack-Afghan-Iranian-Christianity-Koran-Syrian-Hamburg

13.  “A Refugee Riot Puts a German Town on Edge”  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/a-refugee-riot-puts-a-german-town-on-edge/2015/10/01/fa9075bc-65f5-11e5-bdb6-6861f4521205_story.html

14.  “Hamburg to Seize Empty Commercial Properties for Migrant Housing” http://www.breitbart.com/london/2015/10/02/hamburg-to-seize-empty-commercial-properties-for-migrant-housing/

15.  “Empathy and Angst in a German City Transformed by Refugees”  http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/12/world/europe/empathy-and-angst-in-a-german-city-transformed-by-migrants.html?_r=1

16.  “Child Refugee Brides as Young as Twelve Ordered to Stay with Men They Were Forced to Marry” http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/614083/Fatema-Alkasem-Child-Refugee-Brides-Netherlands-Paedophilia-EU-European-Union

17.  “Fears Rise Over Child Bride Epidemic as Young Girls Go Missing in Europe”  http://www.breitbart.com/london/2015/10/22/syrian-child-brides-seeking-asylum-open-new-front-european-migrant-crisis/

18.  “Germans Stock Up on Weapons for Self Defense”  http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/7088/germany-weapons

19.  “Refugee Crime Driving Germans to Buy Guns” http://www.shtfplan.com/headline-news/refugee-crime-driving-germans-to-buy-guns-huge-influx-of-foreigners-has-frightened-many-people_12212015

20.  “Case Study on Middle East & North Africa. Women’s Property Rights in the MENA Region”  http://internationalpropertyrightsindex.org/MENA

21.  “It’s Not Only Germany that Covers Up Mass Sex Attacks by Men…Sweden’s Record is Shameful” http://www.spectator.co.uk/2016/01/its-not-only-germany-that-covers-up-mass-sex-attacks-by-migrant-men-swedens-record-is-shameful/

22.  “Sweden Slams Shut Its Open Door Policy Toward Refugees”  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/24/sweden-asylum-seekers-refugees-policy-reversal

23.  “Unprecedented Sex Harassment in Helsinki at New Year, Finnish Police Report”  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/finland/12088332/Unprecedented-sex-harassment-in-Helsinki-at-New-Year-Finnish-police-report.html

Further reading:

1.  “Germany: Migrants’ Rape Epidemic” http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6527/migrants-rape-germany

2.  “Suspects in Cologne Sex Attacks ‘Claimed to be Syrian Refugees'”  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/12086473/Suspects-in-Cologne-sex-attacks-claimed-to-be-Syrian-refugees.html

3.  “Germany Shuts Its Open Door to Refugees” http://observer.com/2015/11/germany-shuts-its-open-door-to-refugees/

4.  “Is the Refugee Crisis Creating a European Rape Crisis?”  http://www.dailywire.com/news/1120/refugee-crisis-creating-european-rape-crisis-aaron-bandler

With or Without the Archduke

Bayard & Holmes

~ Piper Bayard & Jay Holmes

Conventional history widely attributes the cause of WWI to be the assassination of Crown Prince Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria by Serbian Gavrilo Princip. While the Archduke’s murder was the excuse for WWI, it was not the reason. Whether or not the Archduke had been targeted, the relevant parts of history would still read the same.

 

Archduke Franz Ferdinand and wife Sophie in Sarajevo public domain dedication, wikimedia commons

Archduke Franz Ferdinand and wife Sophie in Sarajevo
public domain dedication, wikimedia commons

 

At the time of Archduke Ferdinand’s assassination on June 28, 1914, Germany and Austria-Hungary were poised, waiting for the right moment to strike.

They had already calculated that they could invade, capture, and annex Serbia before its ally, Russia, could mobilize a response. They assumed that, when presented with a fait accompli, Western Europe would protest loudly, but not mobilize against Germany and Austria-Hungary. They only needed an excuse. That excuse came in the form of Gavrilo Princip, a member of the anti-Austria-Hungary Serbian group Black Hand.

Princip has often been described as an anarchist. However, he was part of a popular movement that sought the formation of a new nation-state that would arise from the joining of Serbia, Herzegovina, and Bosnia. The nine-member conspiracy to assassinate the Archduke appears to have been arranged by the head of Serbian Army Intelligence, Dragutin Dimitijevik, without the knowledge or approval of the Serbian government.

Princip fired on the Archduke at close range, striking him in the neck and hitting the Archduke’s wife in the abdomen. Princip then turned his pistol on himself, but police and spectators took him under control before he could fire. According to Serbian law, he could not be sentenced to death because he had not quite reached his 20th birthday. Instead, he received a 20-year prison sentence. Princip died in prison of tuberculosis four years later.

 

Gavrilo Princip public domain, wikimedia commons

Gavrilo Princip
public domain, wikimedia commons

 

One of the terrible ironies of WWI is that the Austria-Hungarian royal family and its government might have eventually assassinated Archduke Ferdinand themselves.

He had become a source of consternation to his Hapsburg family by insisting on marrying Sophie Chotek. Chotek was a member of a royal family, but not a direct descendant of a European ruler, and, therefore, was not eligible to marry Crown Prince Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria. His royal relations and the leaders in Vienna were not pleased.

After the Archduke’s assassination, Austria-Hungary made one of the worst diplomatic moves in the history of mankind.

On July 23, 1914, Austrian diplomat Baron Giesl von Gieslingen delivered an ultimatum to the government of Serbia – a demand that it outlaw anti-Austria-Hungary statements and activity and arrest of groups that Austria-Hungary believed to be involved in the assassination, including the Black Hand. Austria-Hungary also demanded control of the Serbian investigation, and a reply within 48 hours. The Austrians and their German allies had carefully crafted this ultimatum to ensure a negative response.

 

Library at Louvain public domain, wikimedia commons

Library at Louvain
public domain, wikimedia commons

 

The next day, in response to Serbian pleas for help, Russia ordered a partial mobilization of its large, but poorly-equipped army. On July 25, Serbian Prime Minister Nicola Pasic ordered the Serbian Army to mobilize, and he personally delivered Serbia’s response to the Austria-Hungarian embassy. Serbia agreed to all terms but one – while it would allow international observers to participate in the investigation of the Archduke’s assassination, it would not violate its constitution by allowing Austria-Hungary to take full control of the investigation.

On the flimsy excuse that Serbia would not turn over the investigation, Austria-Hungary broke diplomatic relations and, on July 28, initiated WWI by declaring war on Serbia. With visions of what it thought would be a cheap victory that would expand the Austria-Hungarian Empire, Austria-Hungary launched what it was sure would be a fast and successful military campaign.

The leaders of Austria-Hungary saw an opportunity that did not exist, and they outsmarted themselves, bringing a hitherto unimaginable tragedy to Europe. Four years and 16,500,000 dead people later, the Austria-Hungarian empire had vanished. Most of Europe was left in ruin, and the conditions for World War Two were in place.

 

Tomb of the Unknowns, Arlington Nat'l Cemetery Image by PH2 Daniel J. McLain, US Navy

Tomb of the Unknowns, Arlington Nat’l Cemetery
Image by PH2 Daniel J. McLain, US Navy

 

On November 11, 1918, at 11 a.m., both England and France buried an “Unknown Soldier” in Westminster Abbey and the Arc de Triomphe, respectively, to commemorate the ending of World War I – the Great War. Thereafter, November 11 became known internationally as Armistice Day.

America followed suit in 1921, establishing the Tomb of the Unknowns in Arlington Cemetery. In 1938, Armistice Day became a national holiday in America, and in 1954, President Eisenhower changed the name to Veterans Day, a day to thank living veterans for dedicated and loyal service to their country.

 

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Our profound gratitude to all veterans, past, present, and future, on this Veterans Day.

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Worst Intelligence Failure in US History — Response to Operation Drumbeat

Bayard & Holmes

~ Jay Holmes

If you ask historians to name the worst Intelligence failure in US history, many will name the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. I will depart from that conventional wisdom. Pearl Harbor was, indeed, a major intelligence failure for both Japan and the US, but, in and of itself, it was not the worst US intelligence failure during WWII. In my opinion, that title goes to the US response to Operation Drumbeat.

 

Large troop convoy on its way to North Africa. Image at Imperial War Museum, public domain.

Large troop convoy on its way to North Africa.
Image at Imperial War Museum, public domain.

 

If we consider the strategic outlook in the US military and the US government in general prior to Pearl Harbor, we can see mitigating circumstances that partially explain, if not forgive, the intelligence failures on both sides. On the Japanese side, the Japanese Army largely determined military decisions. The accepted wisdom in the Japanese Army was that any war with the US would last less than a year and would end with the US accepting Japanese domination of Malaysia, Indonesia, and China. This critical miscalculation explains why the Japanese were willing to attack Pearl Harbor.

On the American side of the equation, most military and civilian leaders were focused on the war in Europe. Whereas prior to December 7, 1941, German submarines had gotten US attention by attacking US merchant ships and US Navy destroyers, the Japanese had not attacked US shipping. It was clear that an attack against Pearl Harbor was possible, but other possibilities seemed far more likely. Everyone in the Japanese and US governments knew that Japan wanted and absolutely needed more oil. Everyone on both sides also understood that Japan had thus far directed all its military efforts in the twentieth century against Asia. Japanese attacks against Indonesia and Malaysia seemed to be their next obvious move. Indeed, the Japanese did follow their Pearl Harbor success with southward thrusts into the weakly defended Philippines, as well as Malaysia and Indonesia.

However, the far greater intelligence failure by the US occurred after Pearl Harbor.

It was a less forgivable, more prolonged, and more agonizing failure that led to far greater costs in lives and material. The intelligence failure that I refer to is the US failure to predict and counteract the onslaught of German U-Boats against US merchant shipping.

 

Depth charge explosion, c. 1943. Note merchant ship on left horizon. Image at Library of Congress, public domain.

Depth charge explosion, c. 1943.
Note merchant ship on left horizon.
Image at Library of Congress, public domain.

 

Nearly every American can remember seeing pictures of the battleship USS Arizona exploding in Pearl Harbor. That and other photographic imagery of the Pearl Harbor attack helped to create strong feelings for most Americans. On the other hand, the losses to German submarines were rarely photographed and occurred over many months. Those attacks lacked the “shock and awe” value of the Pearl Harbor attack.

At Pearl Harbor, the US lost two old battleships. Two more were sunk, but then salvaged and repaired. Another battleship and two heavy cruisers were damaged and then repaired. Those losses and the losses of between 2,500 and 3,000 American lives were significant, but they were not as severe as our losses to German submarines during Operation Drumbeat.

Germany declared war on the US on December 11, 1941 and enacted Operation Drumbeat – an operation in which most German submarines were sent to the US Atlantic coast specifically to destroy merchant shipping on that coast and to inflict as much damage as possible.

By January of 1942, allied trans-Atlantic shipping had, for the most part, belatedly been organized into convoys with inadequate, but significantly effective, naval escorts. The UK’s Royal Navy and, to a lesser degree, the US Navy, US Coast Guard, and Canadian Navy ships primarily provided these escorts. They were undermanned and poorly equipped, but they made it more difficult and far more risky for German submarines to conduct effective attacks against them.

 

Deck of U-Boat &123, January 1942. Image by German Federal Archives.

Deck of U-Boat &123, January 1942.
Image by German Federal Archives.

 

The German submariners referred to 1940 and 1941 as the “happy times.” By the end of 1941, the equation was changing. They were still effective in sinking allied merchant ships, but with increasing risks to themselves. Then, after Admiral Karl Dönitz unleashed Operation Drumbeat, the German submariners experienced their second “happy times.”

From January 1942 to August 1942, German submarines, aided in small measure by Italian submarines, sank approximately 400 allied merchant ships along the Atlantic coast for a loss of 22 submarines.

The Germans were amazed by the lack of a credible US response. They could not believe that the US was foolish enough to not immediately institute blackouts of coastal cities or to organize convoys.

While I feel strongly that it is important to accurately calculate the death toll of the merchant sailors, it is impossible to do so. My best estimate is that nearly 6,000 died in those 400 sinkings. Along with them, thousands of tons of weapons and ammunition, millions of barrels of oil, and precious food supplies were lost. Across the Atlantic, the UK desperately needed every gallon of fuel and pound of food that we could ship to them.

 

Officers watching for submarines on the bridge of a destroyer that was escorting a large convoy. Image at Imperial War Museum, public domain.

Officers watching for submarines on the bridge of a destroyer that was escorting a large convoy.
Image at Imperial War Museum, public domain.

 

I apologize to family members of the merchant marine sailors that served so courageously during WWII for my inability to accurately state their losses. Several factors prevent an accurate count.

The first confounding factor is that there was no central registry for merchant sailors at sea. Each shipping company kept its own records, and many did so poorly. Sailors were often added to a crew immediately prior to sailing and were not always counted in the casualty lists. Secondly, many of the sailors survived the sinkings but later died of their wounds. A third factor that, until recent years, had been ignored is the fact that the allies made a concerted effort to understate shipping losses in order to not damage the public’s morale. The losses were appalling, and, sadly, they were greater than they needed to be.

By the time Operation Drumbeat came to bear in January of 1942, the US and her allies had a clear understanding of what had occurred during the first year and a half of U-Boat attacks against allied shipping.

The UK had been slow in instituting convoy measures for several reasons.

 

Captain Frederic John Walker RN on the bridge of HMS STARLING. Image at Imperial War Museum, public domain.

Captain Frederic John Walker RN on the bridge of HMS STARLING.
Image at Imperial War Museum, public domain.

 

 

The biggest reason was that merchant sailors and their shipping company bosses were not accustomed to being under military control. In democratic nations, there was no clear legal authority to order convoying. By the end of 1941, the UK had learned the bitter lessons of submarine warfare, and shipping companies had come to accept the need for convoys. At the same time, thanks to the brilliant efforts of men like Captain Frederic John “Johnnie” Walker RN, Captain Donald MacIntyre RN, and Captain John Waters USCG, the allies were developing more effective tactics for combating German submarines.

 

Commander Donald MacIntyre RN on the bridge of HMS HESPERUS. Image at Imperial War Museum, public domain.

Commander Donald MacIntyre RN on the bridge of HMS HESPERUS.
Image at Imperial War Museum, public domain.

 

Given all that had occurred in the North Atlantic by January 1942, the US response to Operation Drumbeat seems unforgivable.

There are few intelligence failures in US history that can compare with this one. It is true that the US Navy and US Coast Guard were limited in the ships and planes that they could employ against Operation Drumbeat, but those that were available were poorly employed. It’s astounding that the US government did not use its authority to immediately order convoying for all coastal shipping and blackouts for all coastal lighting. Once these simple measures were phased in by the end of August, the monthly losses in merchant shipping began to decline, and German submarine losses increased. While the US was not in a position to use all the readily available intelligence to formulate a completely effective response to Operation Drumbeat, better and more timely efforts would have resulted in far fewer dead merchant sailors and much less loss of ships and critical cargoes.

 

Scientist surveys sunken German U-Boat U-701 of the coast of North Carolina. Image by NOAA's National Ocean Service.

Scientist surveys sunken German U-Boat U-701 of the coast of North Carolina.
Image by NOAA’s National Ocean Service.

 

The primary lesson to be learned from this intelligence debacle:

Even when a perfect response is not available, the best possible preparations must be pursued in a timely fashion.

In out next installment, we will consider one of the many intelligence failures of the US Civil War.

Intelligence Fail: How Mussolini’s Ego Saved the Soviet Union

Bayard & Holmes

~ Jay Holmes

In previous articles, we examined the intelligence failures around Operation Barbarossa, the 1941 German invasion of the USSR, from both the German and the Soviet points of view. An important side of the equation that is usually ignored, however, is the Italian contribution to the eventual Soviet success.

 

Allies Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler Image from the US Holocaust Memorial Mueum public domain

Allies Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler
Image from the US Holocaust Memorial Mueum
public domain

 

In the fall of 1936, Italian Dictator Benito Mussolini and German Dictator Adolf Hitler announced a military treaty between their respective nations. From the beginning of this alliance, Hitler was convinced that Italy, a junior partner, could at best be most useful in countering British naval power in the Mediterranean and possibly in threatening Great Britain’s hold on the Suez Canal. From Mussolini’s point of view, the alliance with Nazi Germany entitled Italy to be treated as an equal partner. Mussolini expected the alliance to offer Italy opportunities to develop a Mediterranean empire that would stretch across northwest Africa and westward from Italy across the Adriatic.

In March of 1938, without any prior consultation with its Italian ally, Germany entered Austria and managed a coup that is remembered as “bloodless.”

The annexation of Austria was not actually bloodless, but Austrian resistance collapsed quickly, and Nazi propaganda efforts were somewhat successful in convincing the world that Germany was welcomed by the Austrian people. Mussolini was stunned both that Hitler had succeeded so easily in Austria and that Hitler had not consulted, or even forewarned him, of the invasion.

On September 29, 1938, France, Italy, Great Britain, and Germany signed the now infamous Munich Agreement, which granted the Western portion of Czechoslovakia to Germany. While in this case Mussolini was consulted, his role was limited to helping bolster the feeble notion that the Munich Agreement was legitimate, given the fact that the Czechs were not consulted at all about how their country would be carved up.

In March of 1939, Hitler again surprised Mussolini by granting independence to the Slovakian areas of Czechoslovakia and annexing the remaining portion of that country. By this point, Mussolini was beginning to understand that Hitler had no intention of treating him as an equal partner in their alliance.

Mussolini felt that he had to do something to improve his prestige. Without consulting Germany, Italy invaded Albania in April of 1939.

 

Italian Troops in Albania public domain

Italian Troops in Albania
public domain

 

Albania had a poorly trained and minimally equipped army of 15,000 men. It was further impeded by the fact that it was already in a state of political turmoil due to tensions between communist, royalist, and democratic nationalist factions.

The 100,000 Italian invaders managed a rare Italian victory, installed a puppet government, and declared that Albania was now part of Italy.

Hitler saw the Italian annexation of Albania as being a sensible move and was likely informed in advance by his intelligence agencies. From Germany’s point of view, having Italy in control of the entrance of the Adriatic Sea from the Mediterranean supported its long-term strategy for the coming war.

In August of 1939, again without consulting his Italian ally, Hitler signed a non-aggression pact with the USSR. Mussolini was angered and embarrassed at having been left out. He would likely have been far angrier if he had known that the pact included a secret agreement for a postwar division of Eastern Europe between Germany and the USSR.

The following month, Germany and the USSR invaded and divided Poland. France and Great Britain then declared war against Germany.

In April of 1940, Hitler once again went on the warpath and unleashed his army on Denmark and Norway. Denmark fell in a day, and Norway managed to resist until June.

Hitler was quite pleased with himself, while Mussolini was feeling more and more like Hitler’s weaker little brother.

Mussolini decided he had to do something to prove that Italy was a modern military powerhouse. He confided to his generals that “to sit at the peace table you have to make war.” This was his way of voicing concern about post war division of spoils between Germany and Italy after what he expected would be a quick war.

In September of 1940, Mussolini made his “big move.” He attacked British-occupied Egypt. He did so after prior consultation with Hitler. Unfortunately for Mussolini and Italy, things did not go quite as they expected.

 

Royal Air Force preparing to raid Italian positions at Tobruk public domain

Royal Air Force preparing to raid Italian positions at Tobruk
public domain

 

The British in Egypt were badly outnumbered both in men and aircraft, but their planes, tanks, and equipment were vastly superior to what the Italians had. The Italian attack on Egypt, which should have been a quick success for Italy, turned into an embarrassing failure.

In February of 1941, Hitler had to send German divisions and aircraft to help Italy try to invade Egypt. By the time Germany was able to send adequate reinforcements to North Africa, Great Britain had also reinforced Egypt. In spite of the best efforts of Hitler’s Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, his German Africa Corps, and three full corps of Italian troops, Rommel never reached the Suez Canal.

When compared to the immense scale of operations on the Eastern Front, the Axis defeat in North Africa might seem less important, but their failed North Africa campaign denied the Germans the use of several of their best divisions, along with considerable resources of the overtaxed German Luftwaffe.

In October of 1940, having achieved no success in North Africa, Mussolini did a huge favor for the USSR. He invaded Greece.

 

Greek Forces in Korce, November 1940 public domain

Greek Forces in Korce, November 1940
public domain

 

Mussolini was certain of a rapid victory over the smaller Greek Army. The Greeks were not convinced. The Italian invasion turned into an Italian retreat, and the Italians were in danger of being forced out of Albania by the Greek Army and Greek partisans.

Hitler was taken completely by surprise. He and his General Staff were focused on preparing Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the USSR. They had not informed their ally Italy of their intentions.

The UK and the US suspected the planned German invasion of the USSR. The Soviet Army expected the German invasion but could not convince Stalin. In fact, everyone except Stalin and Mussolini expected a German invasion of the USSR. Even when Germany moved massive amounts of men, equipment, and supplies to Poland, the Italian diplomatic and intelligence communities managed to miss what should have been obvious to them. This ignorance of Germany’s planned April 1941 invasion of the USSR, was instrumental to Mussolini’s decision to invade Greece.

It was an intelligence failure that sank Mussolini’s military into dire trouble.

Hitler was furious. He refused to see that he had helped Mussolini stumble into this terrible mistake by not informing him of his Operation Barbarossa. Italy plunged head first into an ill-timed operation in Greece instead of concentrating on the far more crucial campaign in North Africa.

Hitler considered leaving the Italians to suffer their growing disaster in Greece on their own. However, as the Italian debacle dragged on towards the spring of 1941, Hitler decided that he had to save his Italian ally from complete defeat – not because Italy was his ally, but because Greece was no longer neutral and was now accepting aid from the UK. This meant that Greece had to be defeated, because if the British RAF was allowed to operate air bases in that country, their bombers would be within range of the oilfields of Romania. Without Romanian oil, the German Army would have ground to a halt in the USSR.

 

Royal Air Force Operations Over Albania and Greece, 1940 Image from Imperial War Museums public domain

Royal Air Force Operations Over Albania and Greece, 1940
Image from Imperial War Museums
public domain

 

In April of 1941, Germany and Bulgaria invaded Greece. By early June, Greece was defeated. So, all well that ends well? No. It ended well, but it ended too late.

By June, the German Army should have been halfway to Moscow with trucks of supplies following it on mostly dry, passable roads. The Russian road network was primitive, and the Germans could not afford to have their Army’s logistics further strangled by nearly impassable muddy roads.

By the time Germany launched Operation Barbarossa, it was two months behind schedule, thanks to Mussolini’s decision to invade Greece. It was also without valuable troops and equipment that now had to occupy the previously neutral Greece. Before the German Army got close to Moscow and Stalingrad, supply problems on bad roads were limiting their armored operations. When it did get to the gates of Moscow, snow began to fall, and the German Army was without winter clothing and equipment.

In the end, the vastly numerically superior Soviet Army and Soviet production defeated Hitler on the Eastern Front. However, if Operation Barbarossa had started on time, Stalin might have lost Moscow, Leningrad, and Stalingrad. He could conceivably have decided to conclude a peace treaty with Germany, and an early departure by the USSR would have been disastrous for the Western Allies.

The great intelligence lesson to be learned from Italy’s failure to anticipate Operation Barbarossa: No nation should take for granted their ally’s intentions. Even friends need to watch each other.

In our next installment, we will consider a great American intelligence failure in WWII.

*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *

Related Articles in the Intelligence Fail Series:

Hitler and a Most Important Intelligence Lesson

Operation Barbarossa, the Soviet View

 

Intelligence Fail — Hitler and a Most Important Intelligence Lesson

Bayard & Holmes

~ Jay Holmes

Prostitution may be the oldest profession, but spying is the second oldest. While no one knows when the first intelligence operative conveyed information to his government, historians can safely agree that spying dates as far back as the Iron Age. With such a long history, there are bound to be some fantastic successes and some dismal failures.

 

Woman Spying on Male Lovers Qing Dynasty, Chinese Sexual Culture Museum, Shanghai Image public domain

Woman Spying on Male Lovers
Qing Dynasty, Chinese Sexual Culture Museum, Shanghai
Image public domain

 

Considering past intelligence operations and their impacts can help us all to be better consumers of intelligence estimates. In any democracy, the stated purpose of funding intelligence activities is to make us—the voters and taxpayers—safer and less burdened by the astronomical costs associated with national defense. Taxpayers are the CIA’s customers.

While considering cases of successful intelligence estimates can be useful, for two important reasons, I will start this overall series with a sub-series of the worst cases.

First, I have a tendency to want to deal with the ugliest and dirtiest problems up front. A lifetime of living in the Great Hall of Mirrors tends to do that to old spooks like myself. The greatest and ugliest problems are easiest to identify in the present, and, therefore, if we tackle them first, we can be certain that we are not throwing bundles of cash and human lives into a meaningless inferno of activity. This likely contributes to the “kill, cripple, or steal the biggest monsters first” mentality of much of the world’s intelligence communities.

My second reason to begin by looking at intelligence failures is also personal. On the day that I decided to undertake this series, I was thinking about General Douglas MacArthur and his ineffective staff. Naturally, that left me pondering horrible intelligence estimates. While there are hundreds of annoying cases to review, rest assured that we will only consider a few of the more glaring and informative cases before we move on to the happy contemplation of intelligence successes.

Let us first consider some limitations inherent to any conversations on intelligence history.

As of 2015, we are still learning more from previously classified or buried information that goes as far back as World War One. For example, I spent five hours today scratching at the surface of newly released materials about US intelligence estimates in the 1960s.

Another factor to consider is that a great deal of misinformation is often left in files that are well situated between any researcher and certain classified information.

Also, old spies lie. They do it well, and worse yet, they do it neatly and effectively in concert with each other. In fact, on some level, most spies with field experience were paid by the taxpayers of their respective nations to learn to lie convincingly. While spies may not be liars in their personal lives, they lie to protect others who were involved in past intelligence operations and to protect any creative tradecraft they might have employed.

Not that I would ever be a spy myself. Spying is a disgusting activity that is conducted by loathsome creatures. My cohorts and I are nothing like that. We are nice people, and we have simply done a bit of necessary intelligence work against dangerous enemies—the aforementioned loathsome creatures. To be fair, I should mention that the loathsome creatures often take the opposite view as to who is loathsome, and who is a patriot. But then again, they are loathsome, so why would you take their word for it anyway?

Spying is almost always a controversial issue, so let’s start with the case of a culprit that nearly everyone can despise. (No, not the president from whichever political party that you don’t vote for.) Let’s start with a German. A German that few modern Germans would defend—Adolf Hitler.

 

 

As the NAZI dictator of Germany, Hitler inherited an efficient and effective intelligence apparatus that was run by the German military establishment. So why then did he make so many crucial errors based on bad intelligence estimates?

The answer is one of the most important lessons for managing intelligence efforts in democratic nations.

Let us consider two of Hitler’s many asinine miscalculations during World War Two.

By the time that Hitler ordered the invasion of Poland, he had already committed some glaring miscalculations based on faulty intelligence estimates. The invasion of Poland took Hitler to new heights of miscalculation.

Hitler made a secret pact with his archenemy, Joseph Stalin, for the partition of Poland, and he did it without the advice of his military leaders, his intelligence service, or his best diplomats. It is difficult to imagine that Hitler had any “good diplomats,” but he did. Unfortunately, the German Foreign Office had been taken over by a pathological low life named Joachim von Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop was a dedicated NAZI and had no regard for logic or reason. He was also capable of tremendous self-delusion.

 

German Ambassador Joachim von Ribbentrop, Soviet Dictator Josef Stalin, and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov signing Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of NAZI-Soviet non-agression, Poland, 1939. Image public domain, wikimedia commons.

German Ambassador Joachim von Ribbentrop, Soviet Dictator Josef Stalin, and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov signing Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of NAZI-Soviet non-agression, Poland, 1939.
Image public domain, wikimedia commons.

 

One result of Ribbentrop’s colossal stupidity was that the many well-educated, dedicated, and intelligent employees of the German Foreign ministry no longer mattered. Their assessments that invading Poland would likely force France, Belgium, and England into war with Germany fell on deaf ears.

Hitler found himself fighting the war he had not planned – a general war on his Western front. Germany’s easy conquest of a numerically superior, but poorly prepared, Western Europe encouraged Hitler’s increasing faith in his own propaganda. Unreasonably, he became more convinced that he alone had a clear vision of the geopolitical realities of Europe.

With much of her army spread across the globe, Great Britain was badly defeated on the fields of France, but her Air Force and Navy were still largely intact. At the same time, Great Britain’s Army, with material support from the US, was rapidly rebuilding and expanding. Rather than admitting that his own military wisdom was inferior to that of the entire German military establishment’s, Hitler became less willing to listen to his best generals and admirals.

This led him to his next great miscalculation, Operation Barbarossa.

With Great Britain undefeated and rapidly growing closer with the US, the German military was forced to maintain large garrisons of troops in the occupied countries from Poland to France. The responsibility for controlling these nations was made more difficult by Hitler’s infamous SS Divisions and his secret police, the Gestapo.

While consuming military equipment and other resources, the barbaric SS and their ruthless Gestapo counterparts inspired intense hatred for Germany in the occupied nations. This made it impossible for Great Britain to seriously consider any peace agreement with Germany, and it made the German Army’s massive occupation duties much more expensive in equipment and manpower.

In those circumstances, no reasonable man would have invaded the numerically superior and materially wealthier Soviet Union. Unfortunately for all concerned, Hitler was nothing like a reasonable man. His military intelligence apparatus and his General Staff accurately assessed that while Germany’s well trained and well equipped Army could take advantage of Stalin’s gross mismanagement of the USSR, they could not completely defeat the USSR while still in a conflict with Great Britain. Hitler ignored their well-reasoned, intelligence assessments, and in doing so, led Germany to ruin, albeit after inflicting millions of casualties in the USSR.

The great lesson to be learned from Hitler’s invasion of Poland and from Operation Barbarossa is one that, unfortunately, not all leaders have learned – that the most accurate intelligence estimates are useless when decision makers ignore them.

In our next episode, we will look at how Stalin managed to commit some very similar mistakes to Hitler’s with similar costs.