Trawling for Secrets -- Soviet Spy Ships

By Jay Holmes

After WWII, the Soviet Union quickly built and manned a fleet of dozens of Spy Ships for operations against Western nations as well as Japan, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and South Africa. During the Cold War, we could assume that nearly every Soviet ship that left Soviet waters was a Spy Ship.

The Soviet intelligence services even expected real fishing vessels to remain observant and report all activity by any Western ships. In some cases, they furnished legitimate freighters with extra radio receivers, sonar equipment, radar detection equipment, recording equipment, and a few specialists to operate them as they made their voyages around the world.

While the US converted surplus WWII freighters to Spy Ship duty and built specially equipped ships “from the keel up,” the Soviets took a less expensive approach. Most of the USSR’s sea based spying was done with fishing trawler hulls provided with adequate generators to run moderate suites of electronics intelligence gear.

Russian trawler SERGEI MAKAREVICH, image from wikimedia by Heb

The US military and intelligence services referred to these trawlers as AGI’s (Auxiliary General Intelligence). The trawlers’ basic task was to patrol near the US coast, as well as US foreign ports and other foreign naval bases. They collected intelligence via their various radio receivers, sonar sets, and radar detection equipment. In addition, they reported any visual observations of US naval activity to their HQ. Besides operating near bases and ports, trawlers were tasked with trailing any US Naval Task Forces and Carrier Groups at sea.

In the 1950s Soviet trawlers operating near the US coast damaged several undersea cables. Diplomatic protests were filed and were met with denials.

Besides gathering intelligence, the Soviet trawlers sometimes engaged in harassment operations. The trawler crews made two assumptions. One was that the US Navy and her allies would exercise restraint when responding to trawlers. The other was that skilled US and NATO professionals would avoid mishaps with recklessly piloted Soviet vessels.

A glance at the seemingly decrepit trawlers might lead one to assume that “bottom of the barrel” members of the Soviet Navy manned them. In fact, their crews were very skilled, well-trained Soviet Navy personnel who the KGB had carefully screened for defection risk.

When the fast-maneuvering ships of the US Coast Guard (such as the Hamilton class Cutters) impounded Soviet trawlers, defections did, in fact, occur. But the US Coast Guard had instructions to minimize and discourage defections by the Soviet crews so as to avoid the appearance of kidnappings. When Soviet sailors did manage to defect, the US did everything in its power to keep the defections quiet to avoid a propaganda counterattack by the Soviets.

By 1960, the Soviet trawler crews were growing bolder in their approaches to US naval vessels. When carrier planes practiced bombing runs against the wakes of their carriers with unarmed practice bombs, the trawlers maneuvered into the carrier wake close to the US ships and interfered with those practices.

In another harassing tactic, trawlers positioned themselves ahead of US Naval vessels and then turned in front of those vessels’ hulls. Clearly, the Soviet crews had both courage and plenty of faith that their opponents would exercise great restraint. In particular, when US and allied ships were refueling while underway at sea, trawlers caused tremendous consternation by maneuvering into the paths of the ships and the oilers tethered to them. Frequently, Soviet trawlers delayed fueling operations until US destroyers forced them away from the fueling ships.

A third important task for the trawlers was to spy on any Western missile tests conducted at sea from civilian test ships, submarines, or other naval vessels. These test range spy operations yielded tremendous results for the Soviets and were well worth the effort and minor expense that they invested.

After the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the White House authorized the Pentagon to take a more aggressive posture toward trawlers that endangered US vessels or directly hampered operations in international waters. The Pentagon set strict rules about how far Navy ships could go in responding to harassing trawlers. The US vessels were permitted to closely approach the trawlers and even bump them if necessary. They were permitted, when possible, to foul the trawlers’ propulsion screws with cables to disable them, but they were not permitted to sink the trawlers.

The trawlers were not as easy to harass as desk bound officers in the Pentagon assumed. On paper it all seemed simple enough, but at sea it was not quite so easy. The trawlers were slower than US Navy ships but very maneuverable, and bumping them with just the right amount of speed was a tricky proposition. As any two ships approach on a near parallel course at even a moderate speed, a pressure wave builds up between the two ships and the pressure varies as the distance of the two vessels changes. This makes bumping very tricky.

When US destroyers attempted bumps, the Soviet crews were usually able to turn away just in time to avoid it. Naturally, these same destroyers were often equipped with extra electronics equipment and personnel. It is a testament to the skill of both the Soviet and Allied sailors during the Cold War that, in spite of the thousands of close contacts between US Carrier Group vessels and Soviet trawlers, there were no collisions.

In 1965, the US commissioned a new class of Spy Ship, which it intended to use to approach Soviet waters more closely. The small (by US standards) Banner class ships were 176 feet in length and more maneuverable than other US Navy Spy Ships then in operation.

USS Banner, image courtesy of US Navy

In June of 1966, the USS Banner entered contested waters when she crossed the entrance to the Bay of Cape Povorotny. The Soviets responded by dispatching a squadron of destroyers and several patrol craft to harass the Banner. The incident ended with a collision between the Banner and the Soviet trawler Anemometr. No serious injuries were reported, and both sides chose to keep the incident quiet. The intelligence gathered by the USS Banner during this and similar operations was considered to be of very high value by both the US Navy and the US intelligence community in general.

With an increased presence of both US warships and Soviet vessels in the Gulf of Ton-kin during the 1960s due to the Vietnam conflict, more dangerous incidents occurred. On two occasions, Soviet and US ships made sufficiently hard contact to cause moderate damage. In the Sea of Japan, closer to their home ports and Soviet air bases, the Soviet trawlers tended to be even more aggressive with US ships.

In 1967, after much nagging by the Pentagon, the US State Department delivered proposed Rules of Engagement for contacts between Soviet and US vessels at sea. The Soviets initially ignored the proposal, but by the late 1960s, the Soviet Navy was sending larger and increasingly more expensive ships to the Mediterranean and other oceans. For the Soviets, collisions could now involve something far more valuable than a cheap trawler.

While the Soviet Defense Ministry and Navy were thrilled that they could finally operate credible war ships in international waters, they were at the same time investing assets that were not as disposable. The harassment game became more balanced, and the Soviets had more reason to avoid collisions at sea.

In 1971, talks concerning rules for contact between the US and Soviets began in earnest, and by now the Soviet Navy was actually impatient to conclude an agreement. They had decided to captain and man their newer, larger deep sea naval vessels with young personnel who had more modern training rather than their older senior officers and senior petty officers.

In the long run, this provided the best results for them, but in the short term with so many inexperienced personnel at sea, the Soviets were concerned that their youngsters would miscalculate and cause a serious incident that could result in a political defeat for the Soviet Navy at the Politburo, along with a reduction in hard to come by funding. Denting or sinking a cheap trawler was one thing. Damaging an expensive new Soviet destroyer or cruiser would be quite another.

In Moscow on May 25, 1972 while the Cold War was raging, the USSR and the US quietly signed an agreement that both sides could live with. Although the agreement did not completely eliminate incidents at sea between the two nations, it greatly reduced them.

The trawlers continued their spy work but usually with less reckless behavior. Soviet submarines increasingly joined them in their spy efforts. Even today, forty years later, the now “Russian” trawlers remain an inexpensive and highly effective intelligence platform for the Russians.

Although they were part of a system that I spent my life opposing in one form or another, I must grant some respect, if not appreciation, for the efforts of the Soviet trawler crews. They went to sea for long cruises (often six months) in uncomfortable vessels and routinely risked being sunk by any US ship that might have miscalculated their relative positions and speeds.

Can you imagine being at sea in one of those over-sized toys off the coast of Newfoundland all winter long? Can you imagine turning your little trawler across the path of an oncoming aircraft carrier?

What has changed again in the last few years is the degree of recklessness of the Russian trawlers and freighters. It seems that Czar Putin is more willing than the old Soviets to escalate a conflict between Russia and the US Navy.

But that’s a story for another day.

~ Jay Holmes

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