In this Spy Ships series, Holmes begins with the early days of naval espionage and brings us through to the present. (See articles listed below.) Today we begin looking at the Cold War Spy Ships.
Press Photo of 1964 Russian Fishing Trawler from ebay.
Cold War Spy Ships
By Holmes
After World War Two, Spy Ship activity by the United States and the USSR grew by at least a factor of twenty and incorporated rapidly changing technologies at a dizzying pace. Along with the United States and the USSR, countries* in Europe, South America, Central America, Asia, and Africa used maritime platforms to varying degrees for intelligence gathering operations.
A nation’s degree of participation in Spy Ship activities was, for the most part, determined by financial considerations rather than ethical or philosophical concerns. The USA and the USSR remained the pre-eminent players in seaborne intelligence activities, as well as in other types of intelligence.
Both nations had large economies, and in an age when nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them were becoming more deadly every year, they both had massive amounts of money to spend pursuing their respective intelligence goals. In terms of both expense and man power, both countries made a commitment to spy ships on a whole new scale involving thousands of people and many millions of dollars.
Westerners over the age of fifty will likely associate the term ‘Spy Ships’ with with the numerous modified Soviet fishing trawlers that prowled the seas and US coastlines, and with two particular incidents involving US ships.
The first US Spy Ship incident that looms large in America’s collective memory occurred on June 8, 1967 when Israeli jets and torpedo boats attacked the USS Liberty. The assault resulted in the deaths of thirty-four American sailors and civilian NSA employees, and several serious injuries to surviving members of the crew. That incident remains a major diplomatic problem for Israel in her relations with the US today.
What happened with the USS Liberty requires careful examination to begin to understand what we know occurred, and to question what we are uncertain about. Because of the complexity and importance of the incident and its impact on US foreign policy, we will deal with the details of the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty in a subsequent article.
The second major US Spy Ship incident that remains an angry memory for many Americans occurred less than seven months after Israel assaulted the USS Liberty. On January 23, 1968, North Korean Dictator Kim Il Sung ordered the North Korean Navy to attack and capture the USS Pueblo, an unarmed US Navy Spy Ship.
The North Koreans claim that the Pueblo entered North Korean waters. The Pueblo crew and the US Navy maintain that the USS Pueblo was and had been in international waters when a North Korean patrol boat set upon it.
Like the USS Liberty, the attack on the USS Pueblo deserves its own article, and we will deal with that incident in detail after we publish the USS Liberty article.
Due to the intense news coverage of the USS Liberty and the USS Pueblo, they are what most Westerners remember about US spy ships of the modern era. Those two incidents represent two failed operations; however, there were many fantastic successes for the US in its Spy Ship operations during the Cold War. We don’t usually hear as much about those, though, because successful intelligence operations are kept secret for as long as possible to avoid rendering them useless by announcing their success.
Because they constituted 96% of what the average voter knew about US spy ship operations, the USS Liberty and USS Pueblo incidents had a disproportionate impact on US foreign policy for several years after the incidents occurred.
On several occasions, the modified Soviet fishing trawlers that prowled the US coasts ended up at a US Coast Guard bases on the Atlantic or Pacific coasts or in Guam. Those Soviet Spy Ship crews had several advantages over US Spy Ship crews. For one thing, the Soviets were always confident that US Navy and Coast Guard vessels would act reasonably and consistently. Even when they were impounded to US bases, the crews had no reason to fear torture or abuse, and in many instances the greatest headache involved in capturing Soviet trawlers was convincing the Soviet crews to return to the USSR. Given that the defection of Soviet sailors from captured Spy Ships left the US open to charges of kidnapping, the White House and State Department preferred defections to take place under less ambiguous circumstances.
After examining the USS Liberty and USS Pueblo incidents, we will also look at an incident when a defecting Soviet sailor was forcefully returned to his ship by a US Coast Guard vessel based on orders from the Commandant of the US Coast Guard. Many Coast Guardsmen consider this incident the low point in the long and proud history of the US Coast Guard.
If anyone has questions about particular Spy Ship incidents, feel free to ask so that we can be sure to cover those incidents or debunk any myths.
HOLMES
*France, Great Britain, East Germany and Poland, Spain, Argentina, Chile, The South African Republic, China, Viet Nam, Canada, Israel, Egypt, India/Pakistan, and Cuba
The Spy Ship Series:
Spy Ships through WWI and the Price of Ignoring Intelligence
I remember when Russian “fishing trawlers” were posted off our coast. Those were the days before satellites and high tech devices.
Hi Tomwisk. Although satellites have been a major agent of change in intelligence operations spy ships are stil an important element in intelligence gathering.
I’m really looking forward to your take on the USS Liberty. Everything I’ve read to date leaves me really pissed off.
Hi Dave. I will do my best to be clear and unemotional dealing with the USS Liberty incident.
The risks of operating in territorial or disputed waters seem pretty clear. In cases where it is an option, can the same level of information be obtained by operating in undisputed international waters? Or do the spy ships really need to get really, really close?
Hi Dave. Coming from a competent and experienced Electrical Engineer your question is the most natural first question about routing spy ship operations. At times being close to territorial waters is an important part of the operation. The trick is to trigger a defensive response from the target nation without causing them to think that the spy ship has entered their territorial waters. The operation itself may at times be to measure that response.
The same thing is done with aircraft. The Soviets always knew that they would be intercepted when they approached the USA. By various methods they would measure the response. They were measuring not just the timing but the methods employed. We did the same thing to them and China currently is doing it to Japan and South Korea, and Vietnam.
Hi Holmes.
Interesting. The two incidents you mention probably led me to forever question the mention of a “trawler” on the news.
I once read that the US was wire tapping an underwater telephone line that ran out to an island off the Russian coast. They used to pick up the recording regularly and it was all going well until they found their black box had disappeared (it was big, maybe 20ft long). When they investigated the incident they realized the contents of said black box were all labelled “property of the US government” or similar. Have you ever heard about this? Was it true?
Cheers!